The travelling orchestra: toward a understanding of Japanese identity by White, Bruce
Durham E-Theses
The travelling orchestra: toward a understanding of
Japanese identity
White, Bruce
How to cite:
White, Bruce (1998) The travelling orchestra: toward a understanding of Japanese identity, Durham
theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4761/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Orchestra 
Towards an Understanding of Japanese Identity 
1998 
)epartment of Anthropology 
)URHAM UNIVERSITY 
3 RT^C EI W H I 
The 
Travelling 
Orchestra 
To ward an Un derstan ding of J apan ese Men tity 
Bruce White 
A copyright of this thesis rests 
with the author. No quotation 
from it should be published 
without his prior written consent 
and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
1998 MA Thesis (By Research) 
Supervised by Professor Michael Carrithers 
Department of Anthropology UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
for Yumi Yoshimoto 
A cknowledgments 
This thesis would not have been possible i f not for those people who offered me help, 
advice and financial backing over the last two years. Thanks must go first of all to my 
mother and grandparents, who assisted in paying my university fees and living costs 
from October 1996-1997. This allowed me to spend a year in Durham learning 
Japanese and reviewing literature. I t was during this time that I met Hiro, a 
Japanese exchange student whose friendship subsequently prevented me from feeling 
completely isolated when I arrived in Tokyo in October 1997. I t is thanks to Hiro and 
his network of friends that Tokyo became an enjoyable place to live. If not for Hiro's 
generosity - introducing me into his world - I doubt I could have begun to see Japan 
through the eyes of young Japanese. 
A Japanese government scholarship (Monbusho) made my Japanese fieldwork possible, 
and my thanks go to those who continue to see a real value in further pluralising 
Japanese society by funding foreign students to do research in Japan. My deepest 
thanks also to Ines Sanmiguel who continues to represent me in my dealings with 
Monbusho and whose friendship has helped make me feel at home here in Japan. 
My move to the village of "Sweetwood" on Kyushu island would not have been possible 
if not for the overwhelming generosity of Jun and his family (I call them the Tanaka's). 
Not only did they seek out accommodation for me, but also made sure that I had the 
connections and opportunities to make my time in Sweetwood as worthwhile as possible. 
I can only hope I have the chance to offer them such kindness in the future. My 
thanks go also to all those people of the Sweetwood community who continue to 
welcome me into their lives and share their thoughts on their country. Special thanks 
must go to Serita-San and Kawai-San who both ensure I do not go without drinking 
partners here in Sweetwood. 
Back in the UK, my supervisor, Professor Michael Carrithers, has endured my initial 
rantings on way-out research proposals, (which in retrospect I myself see as totally 
mad), and has helped keep the basics of interpretive anthropology in view. His advice 
back in 1996, (when I informed him I would like to go to the States for post-graduate 
fieldwork), was that I should take the opportunity to learn another language. I t was 
this advice which eventually lead me to Japan. I thank him for going through drafts of 
this thesis and offering me feedback - without which this paper would not read 
as it 
does - and most of all for the support and advice which has, quit^ literary, broadened 
my horizons. 
The countless Japanese who have spent time with me in conversation really make this 
paper what i t is. Without the openness and goodwill of so many individuals who were 
keen to talk to me, my own perspective on Japan would have remained a static image 
built up from the literature. Thanks to all those who have, through their 
conversations and personalities, brought my Japan to life. 
Lastly, my girlfriend Yumi has offered support and friendship throughout my time in 
Japan. Not only has she shared her life with me - her family and friends - but has 
always been interested in discussing and criticizing my work from the point of view of a 
Japanese national. I t is to her kindness and generosity that I owe a great deal of my 
peace of mind and quahty of life, and i t is to her I dedicate this paper - with my love and 
thanks. 
Introduction 
The Perspective 
In the summer of 1995 I conducted research in Canada for an undergraduate 
dissertation. I examined the phenomena of Generational Change and how the 
Canadian identity has transformed from a community defined against the 
Civilized/Savage fulcrum of English, French, and Native interaction, to a more multi-
cultural collective which deliberately counters such divisions. Young urban 
Canadians, I asserted, see their world as existing between the two extremes of isolated, 
historically defined categories, often perpetuated by older generations, and the multi-
cultural realities in which they find themselves. Such cultural transformation I see as 
the result of changes in the historically defined positions of Self (English/French 
Canadians) against Other (Native peoples). I concluded that the spread of cultural 
diversity always occurs in response to such changes in our identities. More precisely, 
that any change in the relationship between us and our significant other(s) requires 
further diversification of our cultural identities. 
I saw Canadian urban youth as existing at the forefront of such cultural diversification. 
Their generational position allowing a variety of themes to underpin their identities as 
Canadian. They had 'moved on' to see their social worlds as complex and diverse and 
were unable to exist wholly in the dialectal Us and Them relationship with Native 
and/or French communities which had traditionally characterized the Canadian 
national identity. Through this unfolding diversity in the way that Canada is 
imagined, I advocated that youth had become an agent of cultural change • the new 
diversity inherent in their national identities breaking down traditional relationships 
between Self and Other. 
I t was this research which led to my interest in examining the way that cultures 
change from one image of themselves to another through successive generations. I t is 
this interest which has led me to study Japan, and more broadly, how a culture's 
transition from an agrarian to modern state is a process which can be 'measured' by 
plotting changes in the way that people imagine themselves as part of a collective. 
Because this focus comes out of my Canadian research, I am also interested here to 
understand how Japan's youth has come to be an agent of cultural change - how the 
diversity present in the cultural identities of young generations contradicts and 
opposes the dialectical divisions which prop-up the traditional identities of their elders. 
This examination hopes merely to briefly glance at the complex systems of change 
which occur in the Japanese culture. I use the word 'toward' in the title to give an idea 
of the limitation of space and research time with which I am bound here. This paper is 
the first of two planned works on examining Japanese identity and cultural change, 
and therefore can be seen as a kind of extended introduction to the subject (I have 
mentioned within areas which I hope to expand in the next thesis). 
The field work I make reference to in this paper is the result of six months I spent in 
Tokyo conducting research with young Japanese, and a further six months I spent in a 
small town on the island of Kyushu attempting to observe the ways in which a variety 
of generations imagine themselves as Japanese. My fieldwork has involved informal 
discussions, life stories and a variety of observations on the methods of constructing 
group identity. 
Because the themes discussed in this paper are drawn partly from previous research, I 
have approached Japan with an interest in showing how, although unique in the 
processes through wbich the nation has passed, Japan exists within an interconnected 
world of cultural progression and development. If the reader receives some notion of 
this interconnectedness of cultural change from the argument presented here, then the 
paper, at least for me, has been a success. 
Bruce White 
Kyushu, Japan 
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To see ourselves as others can be eye-opening. To see others as sharing 
a nature with ourselves is the merest decency. But it is from the far 
more difficult achievement of seeing ourselves amongst others, as a local 
example of the forms human life has locally taken, a case among cases, a 
world among worlds, that the largeness of mind, without which 
objectivity is self congratulation and tolerance a sham, comes. If 
interpretive anthropology has any general office in the world it is to keep 
reteaching this fugitive truth. 
Clifford Geertz, 1983 
Chapter One 
Social Life 
..at the seaside 
I don't much care for British seaside towns. I t is not so much the smell of urine that 
wafts up from beside fish and chip shops as the smell of the fish and chip shops 
themselves, which pile another greasy layer onto an already well-oiled atmosphere. 
Add to this the heat of a summer's day and you have a cheap, fully microwavable, 
650W=2mins environment. So it still confounds me that, despite such unpleasantness, 
hundreds of thousands of people flock to these towns in the summer to 'enjoy' the 
seaside; and even more so that I , on a hot August day, found myself attending an event 
featuring the Bay City Rollers and a local comedian in one such British seaside town. 
When we arrived, the grassy area in front of the obligatory line of amusement arcades 
was already ful l of shuffling people. Families and old age pensioners made up most of 
those struggling to set up camp near the stage in order to get the best view of the show, 
which, by the way, showed no signs of setting up. The stage, a large temporary 
structure with a banner welcoming the audience to the biggest event in town, was 
empty. My friends and I decided to go and have some fish and chips, buy some beer 
and urinate in a public place. This we did and returned an hour or so later to what had 
become, at a stretch of the imagination, a gathering of people, who bad now almost 
obscured the grassland underneath with their rugs and litter. 
We worked our way mid-field and found an area where we could sit. A glimpse around 
the area revealed other groups of young men sitting and drinking warm lager, families 
with young children, pensioners (who had by now had enjoyed an hour staring from the 
best vantage point at an empty stage), and, of course, the intermingling mass of 
teenaged tracksuited boys and girls who approached the audience with ever-increasing 
regularity asking for lOp for the phone. (They probably made more money that day than 
those billed to perform). 
As I was rummaging in our bag for another beer in this somewhat chaotic atmosphere 
with children challenging themselves unsuccessfully to run as fast as possible through 
the sitting masses without causing accident, the brave Brian Kenher finally took ta the 
stage and welcomed us all to this prestigious event with a series of jokes which my brain 
refused outright to commit to memory. Each was followed by a spattering of drums 
and symbols which served to embarrass rather than fulfil their orginal purpose (which I 
assume is to emphasize that which there was not - a punchline). The children, to their 
credit, laughed, more out of empathy with Mr. Kenner's efforts i t seemed, than the wit 
of his jokes. After electrifying the audience with the stage equivalent of ECT 
treatment, Mr. Brian Kenner then moved forward to address us as follows:-
"Welcome to this wonderful town!" His attempt to whip up local identity intx) 
enthusiasm was a bit misguided after such an appalling start and the splattering of 
hands again served to emphasise the embarrassment of a 'lost' audience. 
"We have some very special guests coming later and I'm svire you are all waiting to 
welcome THE BAY CITY ROLLERS!!!" This of course was poor Brian's only sure way of 
inspiring a certain excitement in his audience. Unfortunately for him, however, 
although the comment brought applause i t also brought impatience; and when he began 
speaking again, telling another few jokes, the reaction was a blatant "We are just 
waiting for you to finish so we can see the band, mate". 
For the time being, however, i t was obvious that we were going to have to endure Brian 
Kenner's particular form of entertainment, and, some of the audience pulled their 
children up above their heads as a show of good will ("it's for the kids") so that they 
might catch a better ghmpse at Brian Kenner, dressed in a ostrich costume, running 
back and forth performing apperently sexual movements with a false pairs of legs. 
Brian Kenner then announced that the next act would be a sumo wrestler "all the way 
from Japan". I was faintly excited at this until Mr. Kenner just "popped back to see 
where was" and returned to the stage dressed in a sumo wrestler's costume, lumbering 
to front stage with a "Ho ho hoi yoo yoi yo - hah - so wo wah yahh". Things weren't 
improving but the children, at least, were responding with some enthusiastic noises. 
When he had finished milking every last giggle from the children and had attempted a 
comical Japanese accent to announce he was very happy to be here in this town having 
come... yes, yes Brian... "alru zya way furom zyapan" he paused momentarily. I t was 
clear that he was going through some angst, finally reaUzing perhaps that the majority 
of the audience were utterly uninspired. We all reflected too for the few seconds, and I 
noticed a large gray cloud . ak .ng ,t. way .nland, and tben •„ the most down-to-earth 
vo.ce had h«ard s.nce h, . appearance forty-five mmutes before, Bnan Kenoer 
remarKeci, 
" I know what you're all thinking..." 
Silence. 
"It's crap but it's British." 
There was a spht second of silence as the entire audience marveled at this man whose 
comment managed to sum up the event, the day the British seaside, the tacky 
organization, and why the hell we were here in the first place. The moment passed 
and we fell about with laughter. Faces all over the park broke into smiles and fathers 
exchanged glances with their wives, lads with their friends, old age pensioners with 
each other. In a moment of absolute genius Brian Kenner had united his audience in 
one truly happy moment. Suddenly i t aU seemed worthwhile:- the smells, the kids, 
even the ostrich costume and the bad jokes. Brian Kenner, we all concluded, was just 
one element in all the crap things that brought us here in the first place - and yes! - he 
should be celebrated for this - for this was true Britain, and for that one moment at least, 
we all knew it. 
... and its improvisation 
I don't think I have ever had the good fortune to be involved in such a wonderful display 
of contradictions, shifting identities, national and local' memberships, or indeed a 
genuine open display of belonging as took place on that hot August day Brian Kenner, 
sweating inside a sumo costume, had just presented a series of essentially racist 
impressions of the Japanese and then suddenly turned our attention to the fact that he 
was merely playing the role of a completely ignorant British entertainer for an audience 
who expected such rubbish and could identify with such low-level entertainment. 
Wliat he gave us in that moment of pure improvisation was the ability to see ourselves 
as involved in a tradition, indeed, a way of life which had permeated British culture for 
at least a century - the seaside, the entertainment, the family day out. In the same 
instant, he also gave us the ability to free ourselves from such identifications - the 
ability to see ourselves firmly positioned in the present - a people continuing a tradition 
that no one particularly enjoyed but which provided some intangible connextion to those 
around us. The fact that such a contradiction was announced with such economic 
eloquence (five words) almost instantly brought us together in acknowledgment not only 
of our own existence as a group, but through the use of the word 'British' a notion that 
we were a people, a community, in a world of others. 
I t may at first seem contradictory that such a shift from one image of ourselves in the 
world to another allows us to feel part of a collective. A closer analysis, however, 
reveals that it is precisely this ability for us to 'improvise' our communities according ta 
various situations, {to behave and subscribe to one set of values or opinions at one time 
and to customize and modify them with regard the people around us), that makes our 
social identities a mix of the products of history and tradition with present and 
particular circumstance. I t is precisely how we go about improvising our communities 
which is the subject of Machin and Carrithers (1996) paper. Much as I have taken 
Brian Kenner's improvisation at the British Seaside to introduce the subject, Machin 
and Carrithers examine the improvisations of Ignacio, a Supervisor at a Spanish factory, 
to investigate further the creative machinery of our social worlds. 
...according to Ignacio 
Ignacio along with friends (and Machin the anthropologist) are discussing a series of 
murders brought to their attx^ntion by a Spanish newspaper. Several conversations 
take place over a period of 24 hours, where Ignacio begins by calling the murderer "a 
bastard... worse than (an) animal... not satisfied with living by society's laws so we 
should... give them the laws of the jungle... give them to the families of the (victims)". 
Lat^r the same day, however, with a different friend, the murderer becomes the victim 
of an unequal society: "...the whole thing is shameful... just a chance for (the 
newspapers) to make money... these underprivileged people are always involved in such 
things". In two further conversations, Ignacio proceeds to alter his stance twice more. 
First he moves back to the less tolerant stance and then returns to blaming the 
institutions of media and the state. 
In attempting to explain such inconsistencies, the Machin and Carrithers, (1996), state. 
People just do change in their attitudes and expressions from moment to 
moment and from setting to setting... On the other hand, people conduct their 
improvisations in the light of a rich sense of each other, and by using common 
tools... these changes (of attitudes and expressions) do (however) sum up to 
much larger changes as well, amounting to the sheer historicity, the continual 
historical change, which is so deeply part of our national character... by 
describing this Spanish material as emanating from a community of 
improvisation we assert that this social world, like other social worlds, is 
composed of such change" (ibid.: 1) 
In other words, although Ignacio appears to be altering his views considerably he is 
doing so with a developed sense of the others around him and how they will respond. 
Also, rather than a random selection of opinions, Machin and Carrithers argue that the 
choices available to Ignacio are limited (and even created) by the history that bore his 
nation into existence. Thus although Ignacio certainly does 'improvise' a community, 
like a jazz musician, his improvisations have established chords around which these 
improvisations occur. The chords of our social worlds, then, are the threads of history 
and national character; they are learnt and become our common experience. 
... and the way we do it 
In order to further dissect this notion that we have an underlying common basis around 
which our improvisations are played, Machin and Carrithers turn to a discussion on 
'landmarks'. Landmarks, they assert, are the manifestations of historical factors 
showing themselves clearly through ones particular improvisation. Or, in other words, 
they are the themes or ideas from which an improvisation occurs - the underlying chord 
or chords being improvised around. In Ignacio's statement that "you can't beUeve a 
word that the newspapers say anyway... them and the politicians, what do they care?", 
Machin and Carrithers see a "...well-worn conversational manoeuver, echo(ing) much 
historical experience of power and its abuse around the Mediterranean" (ibid. 10). The 
use of landmarks, then, helps the observer to see what the improviser is calling his 
participants to share in. 
So if we can detect through one's attitudes and expressions the chord (or landmark) 
which is at the root of such improvisation, then we can decipher a considerable amount 
not just of that person's place witliin his or her community but also that community's 
place within much broader national and perhaps even continental histories. Seeing 
landmarks, then, is rather like training one's ear to pick out the root chords in a 
particular musical improvisation. Again, however, the improvisational 'styles' (the 
chords that are used, or the landmarks that are improvised around) are particular to 
sets of people sharing in common social histories. Indeed they distinguish our relative 
traditions from one another, giving us that combination of historical 'ballast' and 
present 'freedom of improvisation' that, in keeping with the music analogy, creates our 
own particular styles. 
Brian Kenner's improvisations, for instance, relied on an in-depth knowledge of his 
fellow participants (the audience):- Firstly he siermised that we had been exposed to 
the images of the traditionally British forms of entertainment - Blackpool, Punch and 
Judy, Butlins hohdays - and this meant that we could relate to his performances with 
the ostrich, the jokes, the by-the-seaside environment and the laughing at the 
Chinese/Japanese (traditionally there seems no distinction between the oriental 
appropriations). Secondly however, when i t was obvious that he was not benefiting 
from improvising around these former themes, Brian Kenner turned to a more 
contemporary landmark. This was the idea that we had all seen programmes such as 
Holiday, where people go off to beautiful resorts, dine in restaurants, relax on the golden 
beaches and traditional British entertainment represented the constrast in the present 
world - what you would settle for if you couldn't afford the fare to Florida. He knew all 
of this because of his "rich sense" of the opposing and interwoven threads of history, 
tradition and present common experience. "It's crap, but it's British", then, didn't so 
much cut through a common knowledge of British tradition and present social life, as 
much as bring the two realms into collision; forcing his audience's focus from the 
performance of tradition to the shared knowledge of their actual social experience 
(which, of course, is what made i t funny - see Wagg; 1998). 
So we see with both Ignacio and Brian Kenner, improvisations which have as their core 
knowledge or landmarks which relate directly to the audience's social experience. The 
improvisation may suddenly change, reflecting the drawing upon different landmarks, 
but the landmarks remain familiar to the participants. Again, this process of 
'improvising communities' can be seen to be a fundamental method by which we 
imagine ourselves positioned in the present in relation to the past - as we contrast and 
play at the boundaries of our culture's collective knowledge, drawing from the past in 
order to accentuate our place in the present. 
I t is in this way that our social occasions - our conversations which each other - reveal 
the blueprints of our histories. By using landmarks particular and familiar to our 
fellow participants, we draw upon the "raw material" which our cultures provide, to 
hterally create community (see Benedict, 1935). Brian and Ignacio, then, are 
individuals caught in moments of interaction with thefr fellow participants - in 
moments when they draw upon known landmarks to generate a collective. That they 
both are concerned with the production of such a collective - of such community -
represents their normal functioning as social animals; that their improvisations revolve 
around the use of 'localized' landmarks (which would not he understood if transplanted 
to another group) represents their respective places in an unfolding of cultural 
traditions and histories. 
... and what makes it possible 
One of the most powerful factors which influences both Brian and Ignacio's use and 
choice of landmark, is that they assume their participants are part of a collective 
exposed to similar sets of improvisational material. Broadly speaking we can see this 
as an acknowledgment and ultiization of the notion of National Collective. The 
assumption that such a collective exists becomes the style to which the improvisor 
abides - a rich pool of assumed knowledge from which to select landmarks for 
improvisation. We seem to be able to assume that an overwhelming percentage of 
people in our respective countries will have had heard the various rhetorics of Nation -
the landmarks which have been used to generate its existence as a community of 
improvisation. I t is a pretty safe bet, then, that landmarks relating to notions of 
Nation will be understood, our improvisations familiar and a collective easily imagined. 
Using landmarks with nation as their key theme is the beginners' guide to all-round 
adeptness in social life. 
So improvisations commonly revolve around such 'safe-bet' landmarks as those related 
to common experiences within nation. And, to repeat, such improvisation can give us 
vital information about the development of national character and the historical place of 
a particular nation in a more contuiental or even global set of processes. But, 
interestingly the concept of nation itself as a movement, or as the raw material from 
which to create landmarks, is a relatively new tool by which we generate or improvise 
community. GeUner suggests that it has taken widely different shape throughout the 
world as our cultures have begun (and continued to be) victims to all kinds of social and 
economic transitions. 
Gellner postulates that in our movements from agrarian to modern industrial society 
we have gone through several key transitions in the relationship between social 
organization and culture. These transitions, by their very dependence on the 
relationship between culture on the one hand and state on the other, have, to different 
degrees, engendered nationalism in the modern world. Gellner points out, however, 
that the agrarian world did hold the ingredients for the development of nationalism, but 
largely because of its primary function to maintain 'place', 'rank' and a hierarchical 
status system, i t could not "at the same time perform a quite different role; namely, to 
mark the boxindaries of the polity" (Gellner, 1997:20). 
Agrarian society, he argues, "encourages cultural differentiation within itself'. Its 
dependence on the maintenance of a complex hierarchical system means that the 
differences between people should be 
...both visible and felt. I f they are clearly seen in all external aspects of conduct, 
in dress, commensality, accent, body posture... this eliminates ambiguity and 
thus diminishes friction. I f a man's station and its rights and duties become 
part of his soul, his pride, this, once again, helps maintain social disciphne 
(Gellner, 1997: 20). 
We could reflect how, in this world, a group of people may improvise their community, 
and question what would make this world distinct from the communities which Brian 
and Ignacio belong. Indeed, as Gellner's argument asserts, i t is difficult to imagine 
that a notion of national collective could be improvised around in agrarian social life. 
One would imagine that concern with forever increasing one's position within society 
would occupy the social space of people's contacts with one another. These notions of 
social standing and station would replace that of collective nation as the 'beginners' 
guide to adeptness in social life'. Here, again, i t would be a pretty safe bet to as.sume 
that the person you were talking to was familiar with such rhetorics of place and station. 
To put Gellner's argument i n terms of my own, then: the agrarian world had not the 
concept of nation as a tool to allow a standardization of national collective 
improvisation; its improvisations depended upon the notions of hierarchy and common 
'place'. 
I f the agrarian world had certain features of social organization and culture which allow 
us to imagine i t as markedly different from the modern, then what can we see in 
modern society which has facilitated the development of nationaUsm? Certainly, that 
the indviBtrial civilization came to based on economic growth, and economic growth 
which (frequently) outstrips population growth, allowed the removal of modern society 
from the agrarian dead-lock, In turn, the modern concern with growth triggered 
mobility - as innovation became a force which created new jobs - and thus the modern 
occupational structure became both unstable and meritxjcratic. Because of this need 
for innovation and growth, an agrarian strata system merely leads to conflict -
...far better to embrace a theory of a kind of basehne equality A l l men are 
equals: differences linked to their occupancy of posts... do not enter their souls, 
or not too much... a man cannot take his professional status with him and invoke 
i t outside the workplace. Status operates in office hours, so to speak (Gellner, 
1997; 27). 
This equality, then, represents a fundamental departure from the agrarian world of 
rank and status, and i t is here that history, as i t were, allows the existence of Brian and 
Ignacio's improvisations. Without the departure of the agrarian systems and an entry 
into a world in which equality makes economic sense, they would not have been able to 
make their comments, or i f you like, their comments would have made no sense to the 
participants. Indeed, i t is in the transition from the agrarian to the modern that 
allows a quantum leap in our abilities to relate to one another: 
The mobility and anonymity of modern society are very marked features of it . 
Members relate to the total society directly without mediation, rather than by 
f i r s t of all to one of its sub-groups (Ibid, 1997: 28). 
This is an extremely important notion which represents the last thread in Gelhier's 
logical outline of the development of nationalism in the modern worJd rather than the 
common (nationalist's) view that i t is a phenomena forever present in mankind's 
sociality. Indeed, Brian and Ignacio's ability to draw in their participants' into a 
collective seems entirely dependent on their participants ability to imagine themselves 
directly connected to a vision of themselves within a much wider collective. Although 
i t is not my intention to reiterate the remainder of Gellner's reflections here, some parts 
of his argument provide some key building blocks for my own, particularly his ideas of 
how our cultures exist in moments of transition between the agrarian and the modern 
world models. 
...and its comparison across time and culture 
As we read Gellner's argument we could be forgiven i f initially we considered i t 
simplistic. Indeed,(as I have outlined), i t presents a view of society as at f i rs t agrarian, 
and then, through some 'miraculous' departure from an apparent deadlock, modern. 
With patience, however, we are rewarded by Gellner's usual clarity of vision. 
We have put forward two extreme and simple types, one conductive to 
nationalism, the other averse to i t . The two types of society could hardly be 
more different. I t is hard to conceive a direct, immediate, single-step transition 
from the older form to the contemporary one. This being so, what are the 
intermediate stages through which a given society is liable to pass on its way 
from one form to the other? The stages wi l l not all be the same in all places and 
circumstances... 0bid, 1997: 37). 
And so Gellner proceeds to give us a 'five-stage' graduated history of the pohtical 
organization of central and eastern Europe which illustrates the course from a pre-
nationalist to the fully-nationahst condition. Very briefly, he takes us from the Vienna 
Congress after the Napolenonic wars - where "the peacekeepers and mapmakers of 
Vienna went about their task in total disregard of ethnicity" - to Balkan agrarian world 
fringes where a religious and rebel mix stfrred the nationalist cocktail - to the Age of 
Versailles - to an age of ethnic cleansing where one culture means one state - and finally 
to a world where etlmic movements are effective political devices but where the future 
of nationalism is in doubt. 
Again, i t is not necessary for me to summarize his analysis any further here; suffice i t to 
say that he demonstrates how, in theory at least, we can chart the development of social 
organization and culture from an agrarian state to the modern across a series of 
regionally relevant conditions and cultrual encounters. However, in doing so, Gellner's 
outline gestures to the unimaginable diversity of transitional 'stages' that the world, as 
a mix of geographical locales, has and is experiencing. Indeed he points out that: 
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The... five stage scenario presented one possible sequence, but the world is more 
varied than that. Even within Europe alone, ignoring the complexities of other 
cultures, the patterns are more diversified. In fact, in Europe, one can discern 
three or four time zones, rather like (those on) world maps at airports (Ibid: 50). 
These 'time zones' represent "belts of territory running from north to south, within 
which the pattern (of change) is roughly similar, but which differs from one zone to 
another". GeUner presents the analysis within an analogy of a /narria^e between state 
and culture present in the different locations in Europe. That is to say that as he 
moves through the various zones he demonslxates how the power bases inherent in the 
agrarian world (the dynastic states) either did or did not correspond to cultural-
linguistic zones. I f from agrarian times, they did indeed correspond with one another, 
then Gellner suggests that with the coming of the Age of Nationalism no great changes 
were required to align the two partners. Indeed, according to Gellner's Zone 1, 
(corresponding to Europe's Atlantic coast and the societies spread out along it), "the 
couple were hving together in a kind of customary marriage for ages... long before the 
internal logic of modern society decreed that the couple were meant for each other" 
abid: 51). 
Not so wi th Zone 2 (immediately east of zone 1) where the "bride had been ready all 
tarted up for the altar, for a long time, but, but... no groom!" - i.e. a high culture and an 
identifiable peasantry but a political fragmentation which meant no state protectnr. 
Also not so wi th Zone 3 (Eastern Europe) "where the trouble really starts" - there being 
neither bride nor groom - neither states or national cultures. As such, they had to be 
created and because of the "appallingly complex patchwork of hnguistic and cultural 
differences, interspersed both on the map and in the social structure...(the) combination 
(was) a recipe for catastrophe" (ibid: 54). Zone 4, again positioned in Eastern Europe 
but representing countries under Communism, illustrates how defeat in the cold war 
benefited nationalism and helped to break-up the empire, only to leave the future 
development of the region uncertain and in fundamental transition. 
Gellner's entire argument, then, allows us to visualize not only a historical series of 
events which preceded the development of nationalism, but also the locahzed examples 
of how these wider occurrences affected particular places at particular times (within 
Europe). Or to put i t another way, how the tidal waves of industrialization and 
nationalism swept through our communities, ahgning state and culture at different 
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speeds and degrees. This graduated geographical and chronological map, then, 
provides us wi th a tool for understanding how our present improvisations are set into 
the clay of our histories (and to what scale we are able to improvise community). 
Indeed, Machin and Carrithers used such a tool (such a map) when they related 
Ignacio's improvisation to the historical abuse of power in the Mediterranean - they took 
a present improvisation and linked i t through many generations of cultural 
development to a set of historical processes. 
With Ignacio, though, we can see that although his improvisations reflect a position in 
Gellner's Zone 1 (the extreme West of Europe), we see his as a partially self-critical 
stance - he blames agents of the state for the murders. At f irst glance, this 
improvisation technique would seem to go against that comfortable relationship 
between state and culture with which Gellner characterizes this geographical area. 
However, i t is important to see that just as in the relationships between individuals, the 
relationships between individuals and their wider collectives are in good shape i f a 
certain amount of self criticism is allowed to enter. The opposite type is clearly seen in 
the dictatorships of history where words against the state could result in execution -
where one is permitted to criticize, the roads of conflict have afready been well-trodden. 
Thus, we can perceive the criticism inherent in Ignacio's relationship with his culture 
and state as a relationship which resembles Gellner's analysis of the 'happy marriage' 
which the two have had in Western Europe from agrarian times. Likewise, we can also 
suppose that Brian Kenner's comparatively outrageous improvisation "It's crap but it's 
British" also represents the same peace of mind in playing with the relationship 
between state, culture and the participants. Indeed, one would find i t difficult to 
imagine the words in the mouths of a group of nationahsts - "It's crap but that's Serbia" 
- or, indeed, in unstable states - "It's crap but that's North Korean". I t is not that the 
words could not be uttered, but they would certainly not inspire a collective. Again, as 
with people, a relationship which permits teasing and play is one buil t on strong 
foundations; one which is always cautious and uncertain represents a lack of 
famiharity wi th the participants. 
So we can see how improvisation in our social groups reveals our respective places in a 
stream of unevenly spread but universal world transitions, and by focusing on 
particular imrpovisations, we can also see how our interaction with each other can 
pinpoint our culture's position within its particular dynamic - its position on a virtual 
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chart between agrarian and modern industrial society. Of course, although 
improvisations allow us to 'plug in' to the abstract developments related to these 
particular transitions, the concrete existence of patterns of social organization (family 
units etc.) can also allow us access to the histories which manifest themselves in our 
perceived present(s). 
However, as Gellner put forward, cultures are never truly in the modern or agrarian 
state, but somewhere in-between. I n this way we can see modern cultures suspended 
in both the improvisations which they create and the real social structures which 
survive from agrarian times. Indeed, wi th some cultures, the divisions may be entirely 
visible in the guise of class divisions or family organizations while with others they may 
be hidden under many layers of social transformation. What's more, internally the 
cultures may (and almost always have) developed at different stages, dividing the 
people living within them. I t is in this way that the notion that our cultures are at a 
particular point along a line of social transition doesn't seem as powerful as the notion 
that our cultures are at several points along such a system of measurement, being as 
they are composed of many ways of life rather than one, and of many interpretations of 
self in the present and in history rather than the unified national whole that is often 
assumed to be the by-product of the Age of Nationalism. 
...andhow we live it 
But the relationship between real social organization and the improvisations which 
take place within such structures provide us wi th the ability to position ourselves in our 
respective cultures (and always have done). The relationship between the actual 
family and community organization provides the raw material onto which the 
ingredients of improvisation with our fellow participants are sprinkled, creating, i f you 
like, our individual social cakes - our respective abihties to imagine and form social 
community. But such a relationship between real social organization and the 
improvisations which form the perceived social fabric also inspire change - the kind of 
change which facilitated the social transformations from agrarian to modern society in 
the f i rs t instance. 
This change, then, is an ongoing negotiation of continuity on the one hand and the 
improvisation of community or change, on the other. Indeed, as our improvisations 
change to adapt to new and up-dated visions of ourselves in the world, so our social 
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structures represent the continuity of place, of cultural tradition. Thus, our cultures 
are complex patterns of continuity and change, the very mteraction of which creates a 
kind of life - or more specifically, social life. 
What continuity and change both have in common, however, is that they both seem to 
wish to lead the way to what we may consider to be the 'interiors' of our social selves. 
We draw upon both to position ourselves in our particular present. Indeed, the notion 
that we are somehow positioned in both the cultural tradition (the continuity) and the 
improvisation (the change) simultaneously gives us a complete social package with 
which to relate to our fellow participants. The interior, then, is a position occupied 
when the forces of continuity and change meet in negotiation - i t is where Brian Kenner 
is when he calls his audience into improvisation around the notions of traditional 
Enghsh seaside entertainment and how crap i t is. I t is where Ignacio is when he shifts 
from one position to another, reflecting various typified voices from either the tolerant 
perceived now, or the historically represented intolerant then. 
For us as social animals, then, the notion that we are free to negotiate continuity and 
change in order to plug ourselves in to a social network, is our most human ability. 
And as we negotiate our positions within, we reveal the strands of tradition and 
improvisation which bore us into the present. Social life, then, becomes a kind of 
travel dialogue between fellow negotiators, fellow participants. The roads of continuity 
and change are well-traveled as we walk toward a horizon which represents the 
merging of the two - a point at which we can improvise community and thus participate 
in social life. Listened to from a position which considers improvisations over many 
years and many generations, this travel dialogue becomes a kind of symphony - a 
orchestra of people improvising their communities across time within the same culture -
the sound of social life in motion. 
back at the seaside... 
As I exchanged glances with my friends, i t was clear that the day was going to cheer up 
from now on, despite the advance of a large gray cloud moving inland. And as i f to 
enhance the mood which he had so cleverly created, Brian Kenner raised his voice to 
proclaim;-
"Well ladies and gentlemen, this is the moment you have all been waiting for... I 'd like 
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you all to welcome... the BayyyYY CITY ROLLERS!!" 
Everyone jumped up and applauded as a seemingly famihar guitar r i f f blew from the 
speakers. Women began swaying their arms from side to side above their heads, while 
their hardened husbands stood with their hands firmly in their pockets nodding their 
heads to the music (Later, after several lagers, they would turn into frenzied laughing 
idiots). Children ran around their parents in a frenzy of excitement and the pensioners 
began packing up their belongings. 
And I watched, thinking how well 1 knew the people that I was with, how I understood 
so well the variety of opinions and conversations into which we could enter. I had 
spent most of my life amongst them, these people of Britain, and I had shared and 
participated in an unquantLfiable number of collectives. I knew the histories which are 
spoken and those written in books, the identities which are sought and those which are 
disputed. I participated in hfe wi th these people, and with them I have and continue to 
live through our commonality. 
I looked behind me, to where the large grey cloud mass was making its way across the 
North Sea. I was to leave the roads to this familiar interior, to travel to another place 
where improvisations were tied to unknown traditions. I would have to meet and 
understand the musical language of unfamiliar travellers. I would soon see another 
horizon. 
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Chapter Two 
Horizons 
...as seen from the air 
A wall of moving grey and white sped past the window. I sat wi th my face pressed 
against the glass, watching, waiting for my first sight of land. Suddenly i t came, 
emerging from the dense wall of cloud, soft greens and browns melting into a wate.ry sky 
- a Japanese morning. As we descended, details gradually emerged from the dullness. 
The farmlands, houses and roads were all organized in patterns which were new to me 
and I thought about how much agricultural development over the centuries affects the 
structure of a landscape. I t was the f i rs t time I had seen paddy fields nestled into 
mountain sides, roads weaving about chaotically and then heading off in straight lines, 
and the houses, at the centre of each httle plot - the nucleii of production. 
Over a year of preparation had gone into my arrival and my next 18 months' existence 
in this unknown world. I had read books and articles written by trained observers, 
novels from various periods, seen films and talked to Japanese people residing in the 
UK. I had studied the spoken and written language, the customs and the geography of 
the nation. I had spent drunken nights in Japanese bars i n the North of England. I 
had cooked Japanese noodles in my kitchen and listened to traditional and popular 
music on my stereo. I had even - and this is embarrassing to admit - bought an add-on 
for my computer which allowed me to fly around the archipelago in a single-engine 
aircraft, and yes, even buzz Mount Fuji's impressive crater while performing a stall at 
20,000 feet! 
...from the ground 
However, after the plane touched down on Japanese tarmac and I retrieved my hand-
luggage, disembarked and strolled along the terminal through the immigration and into 
the sprawl of people awaiting passengers from the flight, i t became clear to me that I 
knew absolutely nothing about this place. People were moving fast, speaking fast and 
loudly across one another. Girls at car hire booths were clinical and clear cut in their 
Enghsh, which drifted from across the hall. Families wi th babies and children shuffled 
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endlessly wi th bags and baby chairs and amongst the bustle, a camera crew raced past 
Security. 1 felt like a character in a f i lm when the camera zooms onto his face, 
distancing the background at the same time. 
A l l that I had learnt, all the views I had read and all the images that I had developed 
came falling down in one almighty realization that I was in a country composed of 
millions of people living millions of different lives and with complex of ideas about 
themselves. I f I were ta survive in this world I would have to find my feet amongst the 
various negotiations of past and present. I needed to understand how these 
individuals related to thefr society and how they saw that society positioned in a world. 
To do effective social research my interpretations of this cvdture would have to 
from its people; no hooks, films, or blinking pixels would help me here! 
come 
"Oh, hello and welcome to Japan; what's your name please?" The young girl had 
recognized the tag on my jacket which I was told to wear on arrival by my grant 
awarding body to wear on arrival. 
"It's Why-i-toe," I replied in the first Japanese I had uttered in its native land. 
She found me on the hst. "We'll just be a moment; we have to get you registered, give 
your arrival allowance and get you on a taxi to yoxu" accommodation." She rushed off, 
leaving me standing with my luggage and returned some moments later with the news 
that we might be here for half an hour or so as there were others arriving on the same 
f l ight who would have to be dealt with as well. 
We waited together and she told me that she was soon off to Spain for a few months to 
study. She was going to Barcelona where she had friends. I t happened that I had a 
friend there as well and we talked of how beautiful the city appeared in the postoards 
and pictures we had seen. She had lived in Tokyo all her life and told me that there 
were a few good Irish and English pubs which she knew around the area. She went 
there often with her friends; a couple were Enghsh girls. Apparently the guinness at 
The Dickens was good and I should definitely pay i t a visit; she gave me directions from 
the nearest station. We talked also of recent and upcoming concerts, life in the big city, 
her friends, and how much she was looking forward to Spain. 
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And as we talked i t seemed to me how similar our worlds were; indeed, how we 
improvised our community around the same familiar landmarks. Although we were 
from opposite corners of the world, we were not making any cross-cultural connections 
when we spoke; we occupied the same position in a set of traditions and imagined 
present(s) - we were negotiating the positions of continuity and change against the same 
horizon. I t did not really strike me at the time but I suppose one could say that we 
improvised around generational themes which crossed the borders of nation - themes 
and landmarks which could be shared by someone from any country with similar 
lifestyles and communication networks. 
After all I had read on how Japan had particular views of itself in the world which often 
excluded other peoples, as well as the mass of Uterature stressing Japan's uniqueness 
and/or exotic qualities, i t was surprising that my very first interpretation of the young 
generation here made me think how outdated all those concepts were. Indeed, I was 
dissapointed with those who had failed to emphasize how modern Japan seemed as 
connected to the outside world as anywhere else. I t was two days later when this 
naivete began to wear off. 
"Ah, Mummy, Mummy, it's a foreigner^." cried the young boy, as he clung in fright to his 
mother's side. I was exploring the city on my second day trying to get to grips wi th the 
rai l system and receiving a fair amount of attention about the fact that I was a gaizin 
(foreigner). I t wasn't just the looks, but the whisperings of gaizin! which caught my 
attention on my way about town. I t was clear that to some people, at least, I was not 
occupying the same world. I was a very clearly defined Other in theh perception; 
something to be defined against, an object of interest, or a even a threat. 
"Careful!" warned a girl to her friend, as I strolled past them both on my way back to my 
accommodation, "There's a white-man heading back the same way as you!" 
Within 48 hours of my arrival in Japan, i t was clear that I was dealing with an 
extremely complex society where the views of one's Place Within may or may not depend 
on particular views of the foreigner as an Outsider. This seemed a society where one 
had the ability to relate to a wider world - as the girl who met me at the airport 
demonstrated - or to society where the views of self (Japanese) and other (foreigner) 
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were locked in a dialectical definition. 
...as seen from inside a 2DK (two bedrooms and a dining-kitchen area apartment) 
A few days later, still in the midst of a kind of constant experiential flux, I visited Nobu, 
Hiro, and Hiroko, who would be my first informants and friends in my eighteen months 
of Japanese fieldwork. I had met Hiro while at university in the UK and this was the 
f i rs t time I would see him since his return to Japan over a year before. He had found a 
new girlfriend (Hiroko) and was spending almost all his time with her, a situation which 
Nobu found inexcusable, 
"Me and Hiro have been good friends for over three years and this is just bloody typical 
of him, finding a girlfriend and forgetting about his mates," Nobu confided in me when 
Hiro and Hiroko were upstairs arranging drinks together. 
Nobu, in his early twenties, reminded me of a typical North American from the West 
Coast. His jet black hair ran to his ears in curly twists and his rounded healthy 
looking face coupled with a confident, street-wise demeanor gave the impression of a 
surfer-dude/dope-smoking-climber. He had that attractive quality of asking questions 
with appearently genuine interest in the answers and seemed to have a real desire to 
empathize with his new acquaintance. Indeed, as we talked, I could almost feel him 
attempting to align himself with my way of seeing the particular topic. 
"Yeah, well , my Mum hates foreigners. I don't know what she'd say i f she knew I was 
hanging around with you. I dunno; it's something to do with the war and her folks or 
something. Anyway I don't give a shit, she's a silly cow anyway - lost in her own 
world..." Nobu is talking, pausing for sips of wlaisky and drags on his American 
cigarettes; "Of course she's a bit of a special case - most Japanese have this kind of 
positive image of people from Europe or the States, but I can see how you feel self-
conscious, can see how you feel like there is some kind of racial discrimination going on 
when you walk around - people staring and commenting on you and that..." 
During the six hours or so which we spent in each other's company, we covered many 
topics from his relationship with his parents to views of the world and my interest in 
Japan. And as with the young girl at the airport, I had the distinct feeling of occupying 
the same world as Nobu; our differences were cosmetic, the kind of differences that two 
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children talk about when staying up late at each other's houses - the domestic routine 
and their lives. Our houses were our respective nations but our neighbourhood was 
very much the same in terms of the way we imagined our place within i t and the 
landmarks we used to position ourselves in our common world. 
...after a night drinking whisky 
I was tired and hungover as I took the twenty minute walk back to my accommodation 
the next day, I was also overwhelmed by the presence of two completely contradictory 
feelings: the re-exposure to a world where I was strange after a night in a world where I 
felt I belonged, and an excitement about just having participated in my first real social 
exchange in a new, increasingly familiar world. 
I remembered how last night, Nobu had revealed his world as composed of competing 
visions, of perceived histories and personalities. In his conversations describing his 
fellow countrymen, Nobu drew on a historical, cultural and experiential map which 
allowed him to interpret and improvise with the personahties which surrounded him. 
I did not have such a map, at least not one which helped me here in Japan. I had little 
in the way of Japanese historical or cultural perspective, and experientially, I had 
roughly six hours of whiskey-induced conversation! 
Still struggling with the thumping pain that came with every step, I thought i t was time 
to develop a historical map, a template that I could at least f i t with my experiences - to 
relate people's improvisations, behaviour and social structure to the histories from 
which this culture had sprung. I needed to catch up (as best I could) with native 
people's interpretations of their fives in related to their histories, to understand the 
variety of landmarks and their origins, to facilitate my socialization and observation 
into this world. 
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Chapter Three 
Orchestral Manoeuvres in History 
...and where we join the score 
Saigo Takamori had balls. I don't just mean courage to help forge the way for a new 
government for Japan in 1868. Nor do I refer only to the bravery which he displayed 
when he saw that his new government would aboUsh the Samurai class of which he 
himself was a member. He would then have the courage to embark on a tangled path 
to civil war which would cement li im in legend for centuries. Oh no, Saigo Takamori 
had huge diseased testicles which impeded his escape from the imperial armies, and 
which remain to this day one of the more intimate elements of Saigo's history - often 
discussed when mixing beer and history conversation with the Japanese (see also Booth, 
1995). 
I t is during the years of Saigo's life (1828-1877) that Japan went through one of its most 
concentrated processes of social and cultural change. Many see the period as a move 
which facihtated Japan's entry into the modern industriahzed world of the 19th century 
That the Mei j i restoration (as this transition of government is called) began a process of 
events and organizational changes which would alter the cultural and economic domain 
beyond recognition, is historical fact. I t is the more subtle transitions in the way that 
ordinary Japanese perceived and improvised their communities - their voices 
throughout this period into the present - to which we now attune ourselves. 
...one hundred and f i f t y years ago 
The social lives of ordinary Japanese in the mid eighteen hundreds were very much the 
same as they had been for the previous two and a half centuries. Successive shogun 
from the Tokugawa house ruled the land as they had done since 1603. The emperor 
was visible as a reminder of the much depleted Chinese-derived imperial system, but he 
had li t t le power. Much larger than the English knights of the round table, the rigid 
hierarchy which stemmed from the shogun encompassed 6-7% of the population in a 
warrior class known as the Samurai. Approximately 12% of the population consisted of 
artisans and merchants; the remaining 80% made up the peasantry. This was very 
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much a feudal, agrarian society. 
The differences between people were not only "visible and felt", but were "clearly seen in 
all external aspects of conduct", including language, conduct, dress and commensality. 
The hierarchical syste.m was such that men of wealth and power were assumed to be 
morally superior to those of lower status; bowing and the use of humble language were 
part of daily life (see Waswo, 1996). I f our friend Saigo Takamori had been walking 
along a road, for instance, you would have seen the peasantry draw aside, kneel down 
and bow, wi th their heads to the ground. (Just seeing a superior would encourage such 
a response - the bulge m Saigo's trousers may or may not have had an effect!) 
We can suppose, then, as others have done (see Stronach, 1995), that the vast majority 
of Japanese identified and improvised around the notions of place, station and rank; 
"...few would have considered themselves to be tied to part of a greater whole..." 
(Ibid;31). Their positions within their social worlds were determined by such 'root 
chords' of hierarchy; their patterns of social organization were structured by the 
economic condition of their station. There was lit t le or no improvisation around 
landmarks which related to a national collective in the minds of the peasantry who 
formed the overall majority. 
These feudal social conditions were enhanced by a philosophy of Neo-Confucianism 
which came to underpin and justify the hierarchical structure wi th a collective morality. 
Obedience to one's superiors, in a natural social hierarchy was the ethical premise here; 
"with subjects obeying rulers, sons obeying fathers, wives obeying husbands, and 
younger brothers obeying older" (Waswo, 1996; 16). The prevalence of such a doctrine, 
did not, as we might expect, exist as a spiritual remnant of Japan's contact wi th China 
centuries before. Although Neo-Confucianism was a reformation of Chinese 
Confucianism, its presence in the nineteenth century was a result of its deliberate 
implementation by the Shogun and his direct retainers in order to quell the plotting 
against higher members of state: "by making loyalty to one's superior a living ideal, 
(they could) forever eliminate the threat of treachery from below" (Waswo, 1996; 16), 
To what extent these values permeated the peasant majority of the mid-nineteenth-
century is questionable, directed as they were towards the warrior-class Samurai. The 
values certainly would come to represent the majority m the years ahead as they moved 
down and across the hierarchy. Likewise, the feudal family structure of the ie or 
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'house' (a series of first sons, their wives and minor children - see Hendry, 1995), was, in 
the mid-nineteenth century, characteristic of the upper strata of Japanese society (see 
Kumagai, 1996). Within fifty years, however, this family structure would too come to 
influence the majority of Japanese. 
Mid-nineteenth century Japan, from the cursory presentation i t has received here, 
shows httle or no sign of emergence from a feudal deadlock. All the characteristics of 
Gellner's agrarian society are visible:- hierarchical social organization, notions of place 
and social standing entering the hearts and minds of men, the value attributed to male 
offspring. And as is the overriding universal feature, to varying degrees, in all feudal 
societies: "warfare was a quicker as well as more honourable route to riches than trade" 
(Gellner, 1997; 18). 
However, no society is held in a particular configuration, since all societies lie at some 
point along the feudal/modern continuum. Therefore, within nineteenth century 
agrarian Japan, we suppose that the relationship between social organization and 
culture - as improvised by the people who comprise i t - would be in constant negotiation 
at many levels. New configurations of cultural identity, brought about by such 
negotiations, would be appearing like the chords of another age amongst the ensemble 
which represents the present. These new chords would then slowly come to form heard 
and unheard phrases within tJie whole, as the society travels through time. As I move 
forward through this portion of Japan's cultural history i t is the new negotiations of 
cultural identity, emerging from within a predominately fixed feudal whole, which shall 
be examined. As we shall see later, such processes are still very much in existence 
today. 
...echoingperceived change 
The past does not automatically dissolve into phases or eras; nor does the 
present necessarily represent an improvement over what has gone before. To 
divide time is to interpret it, and in most of the literature on Japan, scholars 
have used great events to divide Japanese history into 'meaningful' segments... 
the second world war... division by imperial reign (Waswo, 1996;6). 
Historians do not often pay attention to the subtleties involved in a particular society's 
movement through time. In order to chart such a movement, we need again to be 
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aware of the dominant chords underlying the improvisations of the people in question. 
We need to be aware of how new combinations are found to reproduce more effectively 
the resonance of the social and cultural climate of the time. These new styles appear in 
the background of a relatively homogenous orchestral piece - the dominant view of the 
relationship between culture and state as 'heard' by those who place themselves within. 
These new sounds slowly gain purchase in the whole arrangement and with the tick of 
the generational metronome, seem to blend to the point at which their absence cannot 
be imagined. The previous sounds may still exist - the ever present violins and double 
bass - but amongst the whole, a new set of voices can be heard and will continue to 
sound the note of cultural identity until the next unseen transition. Such is the 
invisible process of cultural identity through time, and as an invisible process, i t is one 
that cannot be seen as a set of obvious events but must be heard through an in depth-
examination of history, by an ear tuned to the inter-disciplinary 
As such, Waswo's concise history of modern Japan emphasizes that the transitions 
which have occurred over the last two centviries have been brought about not just by a 
series of four or five important events, but by the presence of many factors which have 
combined over time to bring about an historically obvious event. In the standard 
writings on Japanese history, no two events are more exaggerated in the importance of 
Japan's move from feudal to modern society than the Meiji restoration, and the Coming 
of the West by opening Japan to The World • a criticism to which Stronach, 1995, 
amongst others, falls victim. Waswo's treatment puts Japan's historical transitions 
into the complex contexts in which they rightfully belong, bringing into consideration 
anthropological perspectives - the o/j^ojh^participation, negotiation and transformation 
within dynamic and often multiple social worlds. 
...aligning culture and state 
We already see, in the mid-nineteenth century, that organizational changes 
implemented by successive shogun over the centuries had produced a "stimulated 
commerce to serve the capital," as well as "at least one urban center in even the most 
remote corner of the country (which) stimulated commercialization of the local economy" 
(Waswo, 1996; 15). By this time "almost every one of the roughly 70,000 rural villages 
in Japan (though not every villager) was producing some sort of handicraft it^m for 
commercial sale" (Ibid; 15). These factors, coupled with the movements of high-ranking 
daimyo officials to and from the capital, began the "first st^p in the diffusion of... 
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fashions and entertainments to the provinces (from the capital) and the creation, 
despite pohtical decentrahzation, of a national culture" (Ibid;13). 
In the midst of an apparently complete feudahsm, then, we hear perhaps one of the first 
obvious notes of modernity: the notion that the local, in a predominantly agrarian 
society, was somehow connected to a larger system, indeed part of it. Such notions 
were entering conversations and facilitating new improvisations of community as 
created by ordinary \ieo^\e. The importance of this for an expansion in the diversity of 
ways a particular group could now imagine themselves positioned within a collective, 
was profound. That this new diversity came about hand in hand with a considerable 
redistribution of wealth - peasants and txjwnsmen benefiting from the new commercial 
activity - is very significant. That such a re-balance of wealth came to be a concern to 
members of the warrior class, and contributed to the overthrowing of government, 
emphasizes the inability of an increasing proportion of this social and economic 
modernity to exist alongside a predominantly agrarian system of organization. 
...beyond the shores 
If we listen closely to the sound of nineteenth century improvisations, we will catch 
another transposition of key, another entrance of as-yet-unheard music • in the guise of 
the notions of self in the relation to other - the sound of Japan as a country within the 
world, A sound of voices enter the whole and become increasing prominent, 
increasingly necessary for the conduct of the whole piece. 
Gellner suggests that we can imagine ourselves as part of a national collective even if 
our society is wholly agrarian. However, this ability is dependent on the notion that 
the society will have at least a basic knowledge of the other civilizations which surround 
i t - ie. there will be cultural differentiation (see Gellner, 1997;16). Japan had perhaps 
less capacity, in comparison with the feudal ages of the industrialized countries of the 
time, to generate such 'us and them' improvisation, since i t was under a policy of 
seclusion of trade and contact with other countries, effective from 1641. By the time 
Saigo Takamori turned 13, two centuries had already passed without any foreigner 
being admitted or any Japanese being permitted to leave Japan's shores. 
This climate of isolation helped not only to protect internal economic systems from 
outside influence (as was the intention), but also to create a virtual boundary around 
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the land which prevented the exchange and penetration of information from the worlds 
beyond. Such seclusion assisted in maintaining this primarily feudal society by 
limiting economic expansion and preventing cultural diversification. Indeed, i t was 
not possible, at least with any basis of fact, to compare one's cultural way of hfe with 
another's, and thus the landmarks available for improvisation remained local, and like 
the economic climate, confined to the interior, 
Such was the lack of information about lands beyond Japan's shores that even Saigo 
Takamori's Samurai class - the most educated of all Japanese - long held the belief that 
"The West" were barbarians who must be quelled; indeed, such action was the 
recognized task of the Shogun. Statements such as "Wipe out the beast-like ugly 
barbarians [the Westerners] in the world" made by high ranking Samurai (Yokoi 
Shonan in 1849), illustrate the extent to which mid-nineteenth century attitudes of the 
outside world echoed and indeed were shaped by those of the seventeenth century. In 
two hundred years little had changed in Japan's concept of itself in relation to the 
outside world - the landscape of social improvisation remained unchanged. 
Again, however, within this symphony of agrarian deadlock we see the first notes of 
modernity appearing from within. Largely because of the encounter with Westerners 
and their Roman Catholicism in the seventeenth Century, the idea that the West had 
aggressive designs upon Japan became fixed in the minds of the Japanese. "The extent 
to which this prejudice was rooted in the Edo period can be seen from the fact that 
throughout the period the Japanese in general thought, without knowing why, that the 
Kirishitan countries were to be feared" (Chang, 1970; 6). In the years leading up to 
1850, this fear among Samurai (fueled by an increasing arrival of Western 'black ships' 
to Japan's shores), encouraged a desire to learn more about 'the enemy'. 
Along with a greater amount of information which became available about the outside 
world - largely from the Dutch (who occupied the only trade centre open to the outside 
world) - came the realization that the West was a superior power in technology and 
science. With this view came a corresponding notion of the 'backwardness' of Japan 
and a fervent desire to embark upon a "quest for equality" (see Chang, 1970). This 
'quest' really began in the decade or two leading up to the Meiji restoration and as we 
will see in subsequent chapters, it still holds a place in the minds of some Japanese. 
Chang's (1970) study which traces the attitudes of two Samurai from 1826 to 1864, 
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shows how the concern with 'cat(;hing up with the West' brought profound changes in 
the notion of Japan itself - turning a land of agricultural provinces into a national whole 
in the minds of those who saw themselves positioned against an advancing outside force. 
Through Chang's analysis of these two Samurai, we see that "one significant by-product 
of Toko's and Shozan's changing images of the West was a deep-seated concern over the 
fate of Japan, coupled with a spirit of competition. This we may call national 
consciousness" (Ibid; 193). 
Along with changes in the language used to express a concept of country - a 
transposition of the word for district to that of nation - Chang illustrates that the 
'meeting of the West', and the 'quest for equality' which followed ushered in a definition 
of nation against Other which came to underpin Japanese national identity Japan, at 
least in the minds of some Samurai and intellectuals, was a backward nation which 
needed to learn from the West in order to protect itself. This 'learning', however, 
incorporated some rather unfortunate views of humanity. To a large and permeating 
extent, the notions that the Western (vvAiYej world was the 'apex of civihzation', Japan 
and its Asian neighbours 'semi-civilized', and the African continent a land of naked 
savages mired in barbarity, entered the musical score of Japan's now nationalizing 
identity (see Russell, 1996; 21). 
Of course, i t is no coincidence that such views and positioning of Other(s) came at this 
point in Japan's nationalization - identity being as i t is dependent on dialectical 
definition for its fuel(see Burke, 1969 and Cohen, 1985). Paradoxically it was the 
intellectual's and Samurai's own categorization of their country as backward (albeit 
with borrowed images from the West) which set in motion the social reforms of the Meiji 
era. As we will see, however, the transition which such men initiated did not, as we 
might expect, usher in the musical forms related to the improvisations of a 'modern' 
nation state. 
...of con tin uity in th e guise of change 
The orchestra of late nineteenth century Japan had operatic voices in the foreground. 
But these were not to rise or fall in volume or number Nor was a substantial change of 
key heard amongst the ensemble. Detectable in the whole were new instruments, soft 
strings confined to the background. The invisible conductor, however, set the score in 
repetition, ensuring no entrance or fade within. 
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The factors leading up to the Meiji restoration of 1868 have been touched on briefly by 
considering the improving economic circumstances of the merchants and peasantry in 
relation to the Samurai and Daimyo - an imbalance which threatened the hierarchical 
nature of the system. In tandem with Neo-Confucianism, which, over the generations 
of formal education and newly established academies, turned warriors into bureaucrats, 
there emerged young, ambitious Samurai who became critical of the system and its 
leaders. "There can be no doubt that of all the causes of the anti-Tokugawa, loyahst 
movement which ended in the fall of the [shogunate - the warrior class leader], the 
ambition of young samurai was the most powerful" (Sansom, from Waswo, 1996; 19). 
On a sociological level this imbalance "...we can conceptualize as a prolonged stand-off 
between the competing pressures of decentralized feudahsm and centrahzed monarchy" 
(Waswo, 1996; 17). 
As mentioned earlier, i t was these complex, internal, pohtical factors with triggered the 
change of government, not simply the arrival of Admiral Perry's squadron (1853) and 
the American demand that the shogunate open the country to commercial contact. 
However, 
The shogunat^'s reluctant agreement to this demand, and to the similar demands 
i t soon received from other Western countries, provided a focus for much of the 
discontent that had been brewing for decades. However rational its decision may 
have been, the shogunate had opened itself to charges of derehction of duty. 
Rather than quelhng the Western 'barbarians', one of the historic tasks of an 
emperor's chief military deputy the shogun had bowed to their demands. His 
military weakness - and hence his vulnerability to domestic rivals, as well as to the 
barbarians - had been revealed (Waswo, 1996; 19) 
The coming of Perry, then, fueled and accelerated a movement which had already 
gathered pace. This movement involved a relatively select group of Samurai, 
(including our friend Saigo Takaraori), Daimyo lords and a small group of nobles from 
the emperor's court in Kyoto. Waswo points out that rather than a movement of 
collective motives, a diversity of objectives were involved. "Some participants wished 
to expel the barbarians at all costs, others to obtain revenge for the defeat of their 
ancestors by Tokugawa leyasu... still others thought only of elevating the emperor to his 
rightful place as ruler of all Japan" (Ibid; 1996, 20). What this select group did have 
m 
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common, however, was its fervent desire to t«pple the Shogunate. When Tokugawa 
Yoshmobu resigned m 1867 and brought the Shogunate to an end, confronting the 
future of Japan came as almost an unexpected task for those who had for so long been 
intent on merely ending a regime. 
At the point of transition from the Shogun era to the Meiji era, we can clearly see the 
wide spectrum of cultural identities in play and, to a limited extent, how they came into 
being. The ordinary Japanese, although increasingly Unked through national 
economic growth, had little in the way of formal national membership. Then-
connections were still first and foremost with their immediate communities and 
continued to be positioned against the notions of place and appropriate station as 
defined by a strict hierarchy system which had existed for over two centuries within an 
agrarian society. The Samurai class, who had been relatively highly educated and a 
had even, in some cases travelled to the West during the early 1860's, were beginning to 
see Japan as a national whole, not only as defined against a powerful West, but also as a 
nation with the potential for transformation and industrialization. Theirs was a direct 
link to society - albeit a result of their positions - a hardwired connection between 
themselves and a vision of their nation. Because of the opportunities to follow reports 
of worlds outside Japan (see Chang, 1970) through the Shogun era, as well as their 
concern and resulting success in toppling a system which had encompassed the vast 
majority of Japan, these high ranking individuals had a vital stake in society. This 
combination in many ways made them the first Japanese to arise from the archipelago. 
This rather crude separation between the two extremes of imagining one's world in 
Japan in 1868 is intended to illustrate the opposite ends of two extremes - the 
continuance of agrarian notions and those which have appeared because of factors 
related to the coming of modernity. Of course, i f interviewed by anthropologists in 
1868, the respective classes would be expected to have such fundamental differences in 
their ideas of nation, but would fall in-between the two extremes suggested above. 
Exceptions to the rule would also be seen with Samurai such as Saigo Takamori who 
gave up his position within the new Meiji regime when he saw that the warrior system 
would be abolished - clearly showing his aim to preserve agrarian organization rather 
than pursuing the construction of a fuUy modern nation. 
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I t is in the extremes of, (on the one hand), those high claiijs individuals who held a vision 
of a new Japan and, (on the other hand), of ordinary Japanese identifying with their 
locales that we can best see the rest of Japan's modern history unfolding. Systems of 
organization and reform were implemented from above following careful design and 
comparison with their effects in Western nations. Identification with the state and 
moves to unite ordinary people in the aims and progress of a new modern nation became 
paramount in the minds of the rulers. However, as mentioned earlier, the reforms of 
the Meiji era did not always bring about a modernization in the ways that people 
thought or identified with the world around them. 
I t ie not difficult to see the cause of this inconsistency. Most obviously, those who came 
to represent the Meiji government in the few years after the restoration were 
themselves products of a predominately feudal past. Thus, despite their intentions for 
wide ranging reform, many of the values and social organization typical of their class 
were merely transferred to the population as a whole. Perhaps the most historically 
transcendent of these implementations was that the "patriarchal family of the warrior 
became the model for all famihes... inheritance of the property and headship of the 
family by a single son, and marriage as an instrument to produce that son" (Waswo, 
1996; 22). Along with the messages from above to below that loyalty and service to the 
emperor were demanded, a move seen by many to be mere transferral of power from the 
Samurai or Daimyo, the "... new Meiji state (saw) the partial 'samuraization' of Japan" 
abid, 22). 
The Meiji government had, then, in its desire to move its people away from their strong 
ties with their villages and communities towards identification with the state, 
inadvertently instilled systems which had arisen from the agrarian cultural state. 
These power relations and family structures had developed in response to the presence 
of a hierarchically defined agrarian system and were now being drawn on to underpin 
the creation of a modern state which would attempt to align people rather than separate 
them. This was an odd mix to put in the sociological pot, to say the least, and a 
combination which Kumagai sees as today characterizing the complex nature of 
Japanese society (1996). 
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...through the pre-war generations 
The orchestra now had a conductor who would ensure that the instruments would 
conform to the appointed score. The tempo changed but the piece was set and although 
new sounds entered, they were soon gestured to arrest their contribution to the whole. 
The government's attempts to encourage ordinary Japanese to identify with the state 
were largely effective. Young people's daily lives - "involving family village, school and 
place of work - were integrated into the values and aims of the state, towards which 
their emotional energies were legitimately channelled. Within this pattern of thinking, 
which could be called more or less absolute, the aims of life to which they adapted 
themselves may be defined as a 'cult of success'" (Naka, 1977). This cult of success 
related to people's own achievements being of and for the state; their individual success 
could be seen within the wider state - as a force behind national unification. 
Competitiveness became widespread and "justified within the limits of a group-centered 
morality" (Ibid, 1977; 24). 
The Meiji government's efforts to modernize its population, bringing them into common 
identification with a new nation and away from the isolated spheres of the village and 
community, had both positive and negative consequences. Various social problems 
affected subsequent pre-war generations and at the heart of these was that fossilization 
of the feudal elements of pre-Meiji Japan and their coexistence with modern, 
industrializing methods of social organization. The expanding industrial system was, 
of course, city-based and with dreams of wealth and prosperity in their minds, many 
young moved away from the provincial farming areas into the industrial labour force. 
However, they were only to find themselves working for low wages under poor labour 
conditions and with no social security, so many people fell back on therr local support 
networks - retreating back to the community for their security (see Naka, 1977). 
These and other factors, then, illustrate the extent to which the local communitj' still 
had a hold on people's social and financial security. In the midst of wide ranging 
changes brought by a government who, to all intents and purposes, was attempting to 
serve local ties to encourage a national workforce, ordinary Japanese took shelter in 
those very local communities. The bonding power which the feudal family structure 
gave to the individual and his family and community - the family structure typical of 
Samurai Class Shogun Japan - helped to preserve such local collectives. The core 
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supportive and organizational units of Japanese agrarian social Ufe, then, were to 
remain as part and parcel of an increasingly modernizing society. 
If we see this preservation of local community as agrarian organization existing within 
an otherwise modernizing nation, then the increasing amount of information about the 
West which became available to the population after the Restoration can be seen as a 
pull in the opposite direction. Increasing exposure across subsequent generations to 
the rhetorics of state and nation added to the import of Western ideas (everything from 
socialism to Christianity) and provided the necessary landmarks for a considerable 
amount of the population to imagine themselves now as part of a nation-within-the-
world. This, as Gellner would have us see, not only allows for nationalism but 
illustrates a society's emergence from an agrarian state of organization into a modern 
one. 
However, as feudal elements were present in the social organization of family and 
community - alongside the increasingly modern organization - there came into the 
nationalizing Japanese identity the first seeds of the Tradition versus Modernity 
dichotomy. Considering the views about Japan's place within a world of other nations, 
this dichotomy is seen by Stronach (1995) to have caused an 'identity crisis' - an 
uncertainty in positioning Japan within the surrounding national/cultural map. 
Taken in terms of the day to day lives of ordinary Japanese, Kumagai (1996), sees the 
two systems negotiated through history to create a dual structure of Japanese society. 
Whichever perspective we chose to adopt, i t is quite clear that the coexistence of 
typically feudal elements with the increasing proportion of modern organization 
affected ordinary people's lives, the economic state and the progression of cultural 
identities concerned with local and national memberships. Passing through a variety 
of rejections of the state, embracing of state goals and sometimes even into nihilism, the 
post Meiji, pre-war Japanese generations dealt with a fast changing tempo of cultural 
diversity - a shifting of key conducted with precision but often not followed by the 
orchestra. The result was a rather noisy ensemble, with the loud sounds, just imposed, 
attempting to drown those which had always accompanied, but without complete 
success. 
Nowhere is it more easy to see the competing notions of coming modernity contrasted 
with preserved feudalism than in the conscription of young men into the ranks of the 
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military. The continuation of hierarchical structure derived from the Neo-
Confucianism - natural social hierarchy developed in response to feudal organizational 
demands - meant that young people were still required to show respect and use humble 
language with older members, regardless of their own achievements. With the coming 
of the mihtary systBm and its notion that place was decided by achievement, many 
young men joined in the hope of providing themselves positions otherwise denied them 
by the rigidity of normal society (see also Waswo). Here, people chose modernity (or at 
least one of its t3TDical organizational systems) to replace one typical of a feudal society. 
And although i t is not true to say that the option was so attractive that the vast 
majority of young men wanted to move out of agrarian society, i t is fair to say that some 
of the enthusiasm and absorption into the military and its connection with the stat.e and 
aims of Japan came from the fact that the modern hierarchical system replaced the 
agrarian, not just as a moral underpinning but - in order to f i l l the vacuum of the lost 
local community relationships - as a way of life. 
...and the sound of post-war identities 
The instruments which for so long had sounded in the background now tuned 
themselves to the whole piece. The tempo fell and the multiple conductors now 
attempted to bring harmony, considering rather than overpowering the background 
voices. 
With defeat in the Second World War, the generations which followed continued to 
negotiate a path between the feudal and modern structures which had come to 
characterize Japan. Such negotiations showed that Japanese nationalism was far 
from the modern nationahsm which Gellner charts in his discussions. Indeed, 
contrary to Anderson's (1991) view of Japanese nationalism being brought about by 
isolation and the power of the official national model, it seems more accurate to suggest 
that the conflict between feudal and modern forces of organization was the direct cause. 
Indirectly of course, the power elite arose with little knowledge of the outside world and 
few ideas about how to implement a state-first ideology. There is also truth in Masao's 
(in Anderson, 1991) argument that the ruling elite's lack of awareness of equality in 
international affairs was a direct result of the remnants of a feudal Japan. 
"Consequently, when the premises of the national hierarchy were transferred 
horizontally into the international sphere, international problems were reduced to a 
single alternative: conquer or be conquered" (Masao, from Anderson, 1991; 97). 
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However, just as the ruhng elite were products of their recently departed feudal era, so 
the ordinary Japanese were involved in a present which, although modernizing, still 
contained agrarian-style families and close knit communities. I t is with this in mind 
that we must unpack exactly what kind of relationsliip an individual could have had 
with the state. Increasingly, since the Restoration, the potential to imagine Japan as a 
nation with its own aims and strategies had become widespread amongst military 
leaders and, of course, the ruling classes. But, (and this is a big but), their internal 
worlds were still largely hierarchical (as Masao reminds us). In this way we cannot 
see theirs as a direct link between themselves and society - the most important 
definition which Gellner gives for the appearance of modern society. With notable 
exceptions, even the ruling classes would have seen their own internal worlds as 
middlemen between themselves and some notion of Japan The State. 
More importantly for a consideration of nationalism, the ordinary Japanese would 
almost have certainly seen their local communities as their first call on any journey 
towards the position of their state. While i t is true to say that many young people who 
moved to the cities in search of employment slowly severed their family roots, there was 
still a strong notion of hierarchy and place in Japanese society. Thus young men who 
would join the national army would often do so because of this notion of moving away 
from such rigidity (again see Waswo, 1996 and Naka, 1977). By doing so, however, 
they merely replaced one community with another - one set of rules and support 
networks for another. This was not all-out nationalism where the connections with the 
state are personal, chest wrenching-feelings which can inspire violence. This was a 
regime which replaced the old hierarchy with a new - using the rAetor/c of nationahsm 
as a flag to encourage people to change from one community to another. I t is a 
completely different type of organization and identity from the nationalism which is 
commonly defined. 
As I have said, this all becomes apparent when we see how subsequent post-war 
generations align themselves in relation to these stands or ongoing musical trends of 
cultural identity. Through the 60's, 70's and 80's, we see at all levels the results of _ 
nation negotiating and improvising their position within a duel structure of tradition 
and modernity. Such negotiations take many forms and some pull in one direction 
another while others attempt to resolve and compromise. 
a 
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An example of the former can see seen in the student movements of the mid-sixties. As 
Naka makes clear, there were two distinguishable t^ p^es of movement, two types which I 
suggest represent the pulling at one force (modernity) against another (txadition):-
The first type aimed at mitigating the social evils brought about by the 
development of a capitalist economy The other attempted to overcome the 
contradictions in the Japanese society of the day - contradictions arising from 
moves to incorporate the trappings of western capitalism and democracy into a 
system of nationalistic state control rooted in the emperor-worship that inspired 
the Meiji Restoration - by putting that state control on a still firmer basis (Naka, 
1977; 77). 
The first type of movement can be seen as one which embraced modernism and had a 
vision of its permanence in Japanese society. Thus the characteristic of this movement 
was modifying and improving a system which was to be lived in. As such, cultural 
identity here was the result of lessons learned in war, of the increase in information 
about outside worlds present since the Meiji era, and perhaps of the philosophy 
developed by those who had fewer ties to the rural, more feudal Japan, I also suggest 
that the lack of involvement within a ie family system would allow further separation 
from the agrarian roots of the nation and could have encouraged such views. 
I t is through such movements, which attempted to nurse modernity into life while 
protecting its people from its hazards, that a percentage of Japanese became truly 
modern in Gellner's terms. Identification with state - that direct hnk between oneself 
and one's country - sohdified at the point where ordinary people became involved and 
concerned with the future of Japanese people under a nation subject to change through 
their democratic power. Conversely, the other type of student movement, concerned 
with a strengthening of state control, saw the social landscape as one of place and 
station, with strict, collective, hierarchical organization a way forward for the nation, 
in short, the twentieth century equivalent of feudal social organization. 
Of a calmer, more intellectual breed, the nihonjinron literature which sprung up soon 
after the war and addressed 'what is was to be Japanese', (or in direct translation 
'theories of Japaneseness'), also showed the cultural fissures left by the crashing of 
modernity into a once predominantly feudal society. Nihonjinron literature was/is very 
much concerned with consolidating the notions of Japanese tradition and its place'in 
35 
the world. Contrary to Befu's (1992) vision of the literature filling a nationalist 
vacuum, I align with Raz (1992), that its purpose is to negotiate Japan's position vis-a-
vis the West. Nihonjinron deals with that unfortunate view of humanity which was 
picked up from the West in the nineteenth century - that whites are the apex of 
civilization, Asians a kind of half-civilized race, and blacks the bottom rung of the 
natural social hierarchy. I t is a literature concerned with combating such views 
directly and crudely by saying that the Japanese are the most unique/powerful race in 
the world and that other races are impure/savage, malicious et-c. 
As a Jew I read with a certain feeling of deja vu some of the hysteric hterature on 
the Jewish conspiracy against Japan. But the real issue is not the (real or faked) 
'facts'... (and) i t is not enough to compare i t with the rich traditional European 
antisemitic literature... (nihonjinron is) dealing witii the problem of cultural Self-
and-Other in modern Japan. When looking at i t this way, the anti-Jewish 
Uterature (is not) Japanese vs Jews, but Japanese vs the west, of which the Jews 
were selected to he representatives (Raz, 1992; 127-128). 
There is little doubt that the nihonjinron literature is crude in its tackling of the issue, 
replacing, as i t does, one racist set of sentiments for another. Also i t could be seen to, 
and has been used to, legitimize the positions of conservative politicians in their rallying 
and nationalist rhetoric. But as Raz warns us, we must be careful to read meaning 
beyond the 'facts', and see this as a discussion of how to consolidate a modernizing 
national identity with the traditional elements which continue to be part of people's 
lives. Seen as such, this literature and related attitudes spring from a particular 
cultural history which is complex but understandable - a cultural history which has 
borne contrasting elements of organization and identity needing hard negotiation. 
Kinsella's (1996), paper on the Manga Comic industry shows a more broad-minded 
approach to negotiating Japan's issues of identity in the public media sphere. Kinsella 
demonstrates how, during the 1960's the manga medium transformed from a youth 
culture into a national medium. Although primarily concerned with giving taboo 
interests and dissident political attitudes expression, i t became in the 70's a space to 
transmit serious political debate and up until the present day, i t often concerns itself 
with pertinent issues "including the social role of women and immigrant workers, re-
militarisation, trade friction and relations with the USA and Asia. Subjects such as 
these, explored on a popular level in adult manga hooks and magazines... are linked to a 
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broader trend, that is, the renewal of Japanese national identity in contemporary 
Japanese culture (Ibid, 1996; 111, my emphasis). 
Unlike the two types of student movement which can be more or less matched to 
supporting either feudal or modern systems respectively nihonjinron and, to a greater 
extent, manga, negotiate the interaction and coexistence of both systems in a single 
nation. As such, their appearance after the second world war and their maturation 
into the present day represent the need continually to negotiate and improvise a 
position within a society which operates under such a dual structure. 
There are many other examples which point to similar negotiations of the self-other, 
tradition/modernity dichotomy:- the use of white foreigners in Japanese advertising as 
ongoing negotiation of Japan's place vis-a-vis the West and the world (Creighton, 1995), 
the use of the black other in mass culture, again playing with the boundaries of racial 
superiority, and equality (see Russell, 1996), and the rhetoric of 'internationalization' as 
a negotiation of Japan's place in a world of nations - be i t internal exclusivity or an open 
minded desire to learn about other cultures (see Shuichi, 1992 and Yasushi, 1992). 
Since the engineers' of the Meiji era have entwined their Japanese design with the 
threads of their own feudalism and those of the western worlds modernity, the Japanese 
have been in constant negotiation and improvisation with regard to this central pivot of 
their cultural histories. The results have been incredibly wide-ranging, and there are 
many ways in which Japan, its cultural heritage and diversity, come to be imagined in 
the improvisations of community which occur within its borders. What is clear is that 
the diversity itself represents a people hound to the forces of a dynamic nation state 
with a rich cultural history. Japan has emerged a modern nation, but its particular 
balancing between the presence of modern and agrarian social systems give the 
Japanese, as with all the nationalities on earth, a set of unique cultural histories and 
identities from which to improvise their social lives. 
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Chapter Four 
Sweetwood and Bitter Branches 
The town of Sweetwood lies in a large plain. Two mountain ranges enclose i t on the 
north and south. Looking east along the plain, the ranges seem to meet in the far 
distance, and at their meeting the snaking river, which runs through the centre of the 
land, disappears from view. Looking west, the plain expands, widening the distance 
between the mountains, and other towns can be discerned amongst the shining paddy 
fields which patchwork the valley floor. "Sweetwood", the name of the town itself, is 
also the name of the surrounding county, which is large in comparison to its neighbours. 
Its boundaries reach north and south into the nearby hills and also encompass much of 
the plain on which the main town sits. The county population is 40,000, of which 
perhaps half hve in the town and its surrounds. The town centre has a shopping 
arcade and a few tall buildings - the eight-story Sweetwood hotel being the biggest. A 
few minutes' walk out of the centre, however, the quiet narrow streets run past paddy 
fields and large farmhouses. The primary purpose of these roads, i t seems, is to 
provide access to the network of irrigation channels that feed the rice fields. Despite 
the recent building of superstores and pachinko parlors on the outskirts, the sound of 
water running underfoot and the view of the silver-green fields against the hard ridges 
of the mountains, give the town of Sweetwood an air of permanence, of continuity, and of 
resistance to change. 
I t was nine months later and I felt I now had a grasp on the cultural history and 
diversification of Japan. My studies and the many people I had conversed with over 
that time had given me a cultural map which I now used to help me interpret people's 
positions within their improvised social worlds. I could, to a certain extent, now see 
people as products of particular generations or economic brackets, or of rural or urban 
areas, or as exceptions to such categorizations. I could see, behind the landmarks they 
improvised around, the points in history where such ideas and notions had become 
available, and, to a lesser extent, their development through history into the sociality of 
the present. My six months in Tokyo had given me the chance to see Japan at i t most 
contemporary modern, all those elements of modernity being concentrated here and in 
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other large cities for generations. My last three months in a small town on the 
southern island of Kyushu had allowed me to see the continuing struggles between the 
negotiation of tradition and modernity. As I myself became assimilated into the local 
community, my experiences entwined with my historical and cultural knowledge, 
making me too one of the lives involved in the constant border-disputes of the tradition 
versus modern fulcrum in Japanese community life. 
"Well, I'm just not quite sure how to explain it to you," Sato-San says in a tone of 
exasperation. "It's like, well, Japanese culture.,,. You just can't invite Bando-San, 
and we have to give up on my sister and brother-in-law as well - he'll never have it", 
"But I just don't see the problem," I retort in a state of agitation myself. "This is a 
party for friends and people who have helped me in my life here in Sweetwood, I t is 
/nj'party and I can't see for the hfe of me why Tanaka-San has the right to decide who is 
or is not coming. Also, there is no way I will now say to people that I have already 
invited that they are no longer welcome. My friends are coming to this party and if 
that happens to be a problem for Tanaka-San, as some of them are his employees, then 
that is a situation he will have to deal with." 
Sato-San sighs and for a moment I feel sorry for him. He's not getting through to me 
and through my own frustration, a moment of empathy comes. I see him attempting to 
explain a situation to someone who has no capacity to understand. I feel for a moment 
like an outsider, but I have felt this before and found it to be an over-sensitivity on my 
part; I inject confidence into the vein of my emotion. 
"Look," Sato-San says with the same air of exasperation, "Yamada-San will be here soon 
and can explain the situation to you better than I can. In fact I ' l l call him now and see 
where he's got to". Sato-San reaches for my phone and dials. "Yeah, Yamada. Look I 
told you he wouldn't hear it from me; you need to get over here. OK, OK; ten minutes? 
Right", He hangs up, "He's on his way". The words, uttered in a tone of inevitabihty 
and slight regret, have the effect of putting me on edge, and Sato-San, usually a 
conversationalist, sits silently fidgeting, awaiting the back-up of his work colleague and 
friend. 
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The whole thing had started quite innocently. I had family coming to visit from Britain 
and I had decided that in order to say "thank you" to all those people who had been so 
generous to me over the three months or so I had lived in Sweetwood, I would throw a 
party. This, I knew, would interest the local people, as foreigners were a rare 
commodity here in the southern Japanese countryside and the prospect of having four 
together at the same place, rather than just the usual one, would no doubt cause a stir. 
As i t happened, the person I most wanted to introduce to my family and who had been 
the greatest help to me in my move to the country, (volunteering to be my guarantor, 
buying me furniture etc.), was one of the most 'important' people in the town. 
Tanaka-San was head of a transport company which he had built up from scratch. His 
company not only directly employed local people as lorry drivers, admin, staff or packers 
and causal workers, but also contracted the local construction company to build its 
buildings, the local electric's company for its computers, and so on. In short, there 
were a probably a hundred or more people benefiting directly from Tanaka-San's 
business and the local construction company, for one, would have gone under if not for 
his contracts. This gave Tanaka-San a god-like status, Anything that he requhed, 
whether it be on a business or personal basis, was provided by someone, and that 
someone was often Sato-San, the 44 year old sales manager for the local construction 
company, who was now in my apartment awaiting the arrival of his friend. 
I t was Satx)-San who had secured my apartment, under the instructions of Tanaka-San, 
Sato-San who had taken me to the various county offices and waited for hours while I 
completed my resident-alien status applications. Sato-San was essentially Tanaka-
San's servant, dealing with his every need, whether that be work related or otherwise. 
Sato-San had sat with me working out schedules for my fieldwork, spanning the whole 
year I would be in Sweetwood. He had taken me to maybe twenty households, 
introduced me to various famihes and had always said to them, on departing, that he 
would be grateful if they could keep in touch with me. I t was these people, almost all of 
whom I had met through Sato-San months before, who were now being invited to my 
party. Sato-San had built up my social network under the order of Tanaka-San, who, 
despite his lofty position and often bossy demeanor, wanted the best to come of my 
year's research in his hometown of Sweetwood. 
Tanaka-San, in his early sixties, was the father of a friend of mine in Tokyo. One night 
over a few drinks I had told this friend how I wanted to move from the city into a small 
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community to complete the second phase of my research. I had read that the southern 
island of Kyushu was still a traditionally-minded place in comparison with Honshu, the 
main island, and as I was in search of tradition, or at least its state of coexistence with 
the modern, i t seemed as good a place as any on which to set my sights. When I 
explained this to my friend, along with voicing my intention \a visit the island, he 
offered to take me to stay with his family on his next trip back - they live in Sweetwood. 
So i t was that I met his father Tanaka-San, the stocky, self-made business man who 
spoke a hard, aggressive Japanese. Despite his son's appeals to me to forgive him for 
"not being the most intelligent man", Tanaka-San struck me as quite the philosopher. 
The first night I spent in the company of the Tanaka's (husband, wife and son), we 
talked of how when visiting other countries, i t is impossible to gain any idea of culture 
through the veil of the 'visitor' and that to see any genuine cultural interaction between 
people, one must have a friend or relative through which to become assimilated. I t was 
on the surf of this inter-cultural understanding, combined with countless beers, that I , 
in a moment of utter relaxation, dropped all respective language (used with people older 
than oneself, and referring to myself as ore (not something 1 usually do in such 
situations), slapped Tanaka-San on the back with repeated insistence that he come to 
England where I would introduce him to all things otherwise unattainable without 
aforementioned native friend. 
Taking this informality rather well, (probably assuming that all British people are 
absurdly direct), Tanaka-San collected more beer from the fridge and after a gusty 
"Cheers!", his son suggested that I become the third son of the family. This, again, was 
taken well by Tanaka-San who nodded solemnly as his son explained to his parents that 
I was now their third son, and, while I choked in the corner, negotiation took place as to 
where I would live and how best Tanaka-San could facilitate my introduction into the 
small town Sweetwood community. 
The door bell rang and Sato-San, knowing i t would be his friend said nothing but 
stopped his fidgeting. I rose, opened the door and greeted Yamada-San. 
"Yamada-San. Do come in! It's been a long time since I've seen you. Last time was 
when you Sato-San and I were all out drinking together around Sweetwood - must be at 
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least a month ago eh?" I ushered lum in, well aware that an exchange of pleasantries 
was necessary before the discussion of the main topic. I t was my discomfort at making 
nice noises for the sake of it - the awkwardness of the questionable sincerity of 
statement - which prompted me to drop this form of speaking sooner than Yamada-San, 
or Sato-San might have expected. In fact, so soon did I choose to take possession of the 
conversation that poor Yamada-San, a gentle, good natured family man in his early 
forties, hardly had the time to reply to my initial greeting. 
"Well, look here... have a seat... Thanks for coming to explain this situation to me. I 
see very clearly what we are up against here - Tanaka-San's big and far ranging 
personality!". And there i t was, my pitch; I awaited the reply. I t came instantly. 
"No," said Yamada-San, "this is not about Tanaka-San's character". He paused, 
glanced at Sato-San, who, defeated in his attempts to get me to change my invitation 
list, sat in the corner of the tatami-mat room, a picture of dejection. "How are we best 
to explain these complex things to you, Bruce?" He collected himself for a moment and 
said, "Japanese culture. This is really about Japanese culture". I t was the same 
explanation I had heard from Sato-San. I fundamentally disagreed, but Hstened to 
Yamada-San as he spoke in his softKyushuu tongue. 
"The problem is that Tanaka-San is a very important person here in Sweetwood. And 
as a very important person, he feels that attending a party where there will be people 
beneath him, a party which essentially will treat him as a guest amongst others, rather 
than a person with the status he has, is impossible. Furthermore, that you, whom he 
regards as almost a son, have not considered this in your plans, inviting as you have, 
one of his employees as well as a host of people he does not know, adds to the 
awkwardness of the situation". My heart sank at this. My intention, to bring 
Tanaka-San into my group - my way of doing things • was being construed as a lack of 
consideration for him by the community. 
"You see, Bruce," Yamada-San said with a tone of kindness, "people generally just don't 
have parties like this in Japan so therefore, you are going to be up against this kind of 
problem". Having lived in Tokyo, I knew that Japanese did indeed have parties just 
like this, where a variety of different people are invited to a function. However, I could 
see that here in the country i t could be construed as unusual. Anyway whatever the 
interpretation, I was not prepared to change my plans or the invitation list, and with 
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the traces of anger and resentment that come when actions attempting to bring people 
together are read otherwise, 1 recharged my confidence and decided to give an 
alternative explanation of what was being bracketed here as 'Japanese culture'. 
"As far as 1 am concerned, this party's purpose is to involve those people who have been 
of help to me here, in the welcoming of my family members from Britain. All thirty or 
so people invited have shown eagerness, asked no questions as to the other guests and 
shown no surprise in the fact that such a party is taking place and that they are being 
invited to it. I am aware that such gatherings bringing people together in such a 
random way are unusual but considering that Tanaka-San is the only one expressing 
any concern, I do not see this problem's relation to 'Japanese culture'. Are we not, after 
all, dealing simply witli Tanaka-San's personality?" 
The words had a strange effect on Yamada-San, as i f I was speaking some secret 
language - voicing the behind-the-scenes or honne content of the situation. My 
statements seemed to appeal to his "up-for-those-subservient-under-difficult-authority-
figures" side, a common stress for those who work in the world of business hierarchy. 
Instead of countering the statements or attempting to pursue the argument, he merely 
smiled widely and said, 
"Well, yeah, that's true, isn't it?" Pleased at the shift of emphasis away from a man 
quite justified in his objection to attending a party containing his own employees by 
some idea of cultural hierarchical inevitability, to the presence of a self-important 
personality present in an otherwise equal mix of people, I relaxed somewhat. I t was, 
after all, the explanation in which I wanted to frame the event - abnormality and 
narrow mindedness in a community of openness and good wiU. I t was one that 
Yamada-San also saw as useful, and it was after my own insistence that what was 
required was for me to go durectly to Tanaka-San's house that evening to 'consult' with 
him, that both Yamada-San and Sato-San took their leave, having done whatever they 
could to be the neutral negotiators for what could have become a situation of conflict 
and misunderstanding. 
But as they left, I felt a sudden separation from the fabric of their social world. I had 
won a conversation that I didn't mean to fight. I had imposed my way of 
understanding the relationships involved, and the problem that had arisen. And 
although Yamada-San • had understood my interpretation of the event, seen i t 
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immediately in all its simplicity of separating of the problem-individual from the group, 
I hadn't revealed the ability to see his. As I stood in door way watching them chmb 
into their cars, I knew that i t was because I didn't want to see it - a world where 
hierarchy divides people for the sake of a continuity of social organization and 
avoidance of conflict - where social station "enters the hearts and souls of men". In all 
my good intentions to bring people together, I had imposed wy value system, which I 
naively thought to be shared by everyone. But i t was here, in encountering opposition 
to such intentions, as well as in understanding two fundamentally different 
explanations as to the cause of such opposition, that I had stumbled on that pivotal 
point between the traditional and the modern organization which characterizes 
Japanese community life. 
In attempting to give Yamada-San the same gift of understanding which he was able to 
accord me, a certain amount needs to be understood about the relationships and 
hierarchies which comprise a Japanese community. One of the fundamental points 
here is that the interaction between people in a traditional Japanese community is a 
complex art form involving use of language, gift-giving, choice of topic, expression (or 
concealing) of emotion, and appropriate behaviour with regard to superiors. As 
Hendry's work (1992, 1995) points out, this art of interaction is learnt from childhood 
and i t is the home, and the relationships which occur within it, which provide a child's 
first lessons in his or her 'place' in the world. As the traditional ie family system is 
composed of the hierarchies relating to Neo-Confucianism, and the values of a part-
feudal Japan - the same family system which was preserved and transferred to the 
population as a whole in the Meiji era - the hierarchical relationships are here instilled 
to be transferred later to the wider community. 
The traditional ie family system, then, can be seen as a kind of factory for the 
production of people who generate and maintain close relationships between households 
which thus produce a Japanese community. Because of the complex systems of 
interaction which exist, ties between people are strong within interacting networks of 
households, and weak outside such virtual groups. Thus, traditionally the hnks 
between people are carefully maintained and casual random cross-group mixing and 
meeting is not the norm. 
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Here, then, we get the first inkling of what Yamada-San was attempting to explain to 
me using his 'Japanese Culture' explanation. He was gesturing to the structural 
composition of Japanese communities, and bow, when asked to make cross-group 
affiliations which go against the careful maintenance of in-group collectives, people may 
feel that they are unable to make appropriate adjustments of place - the very subtle 
adjustments which underpin the construction of the community and the traditional 
social environment. 
I argue here that this social classification within community and its intricate 
construction represent the feudal organizational remnants of the pre-Meiji era in 
contemporary Japan. We see how interaction between people is based upon 
positioning of place and station, concepts inherent to an agrarian society. We also see, 
in Tanaka-San's response to the party, the absoluteness of such hierarchical parameters. 
In Gellner's terms "Agrarian society depends on the maintenance of a complex system of 
ranks, and it is important that these be both visible and felt" (1997; 20). I t was 
Tanaka-San's concept that his rank would be invisible at the party which concerned him 
most, as if to lose sight of rank would dissolve his identity within the community. 
Inherent in Yamada-San's explanation is the notion that this ranking will inevitably 
cause conflict if the correct rules are not followed. As such, my throwing of the party, 
although primarily designed to bring people together, risked of causing station-related 
problems. His logic, not acknowledged by me at the time, was flawless. Yamada-San 
had seen the problem in more anthropological terms than I had been able to do. 
Rather than isolating Tanaka-San as an problem-individual within a bounded group, he 
saw him as a integral part of an evolving, carefully balanced community involved in the 
production of complex relationships and alliances. This was flawless logic applied to 
the complex workings of a traditional community with its related set of values. 
The abihty Yamada-San displayed in applying my explanatory model - indeed to see 
both models as explanations - shows he could view egalitarian values within and 
against a hierarchically-defined society. If modern society as Gellner advances, 
appeals to equality and to mobility within itself, then in a 'truly' modern society, my 
explanation of Tanaka-San being a problem-individual, in a open minded community is 
appropriate for the case. Here Tanaka-San's position would be seen as an 
inappropriate self-importance which prevented him from mixing successfully in 'normal' 
society. My explanation to Yamada-San, emphasizing the fact that the other thirty 
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invites had no such response, illustrates the logic of the position. Yamada-San's 
immediate grasp of such a explanation shifted his focus to the alternative explanatory 
model which exists alongside that which he initially gave me. This is to see the 
community in egalitarian terms - in terms of personalities in social space and a 
collective of people who have an equal stake in society. In short, he saw and 
acknowledged the modern interpretation. 
I f Yamada-San, then, demonstrates the possession of a dual model for social 
organization and identity, consisting of traditional and modern modes of seeing the 
world, then two questions arise; 1. Why then does Tanaka-San not have such a dual 
model, and 2. Where does Yamada-San's ability come from? I suggest that the answers 
to both of the questions are related to the concept of Generational Change, and, in 
particular, to that ongoing negotiation identified in the previous chapter, between 
tradition and modernity, as present and accessible to particular generations of 
Japanese. 
Before embarking on a argument which emphasizes Tanaka-San's generational place in 
the unfolding of identity diversification in Japan, i t would be shirking anthropological 
responsibihty not to reiterate the point which Hendry herself draws from Dumont's 
Homo Hierarchicus (1980). Simply, this is that hierarchy is a integral part of all 
human sociality and that such ranking may be "quite independent of natural 
inequalities or the distribution of power" (Dumont, from Hendry 1995; 76). Implicit in 
this notion is that hierarchical structures underhe and entwine with cultural 
organization in multiple ways. The workings of hierarchy, then, are highly cultural-
specific and we must "recognize that the assumptions one brings to the subject from 
one's own background may need radical revision in a different cultural context" (Hendry, 
1995; 76). 
This is essential knowledge if we are to see Tanaka-San as a product of his culture and 
not, (according to the modern interpretation), as an abnormal or difficult person. For 
Tanaka-San, the organization of his world, as defined by the significant others who 
surround him, is directly related to a strict adherence to place and station. Thus, he 
will not attend a function which does not acknowledge his position vis-a-vis the other 
participants. He will not put himself in a position where status positions are 
questioned or uncertain. And most of all, he is unable to relate to a particular person 
differently in different contexts - his employee is always inferior and servile whether 'in 
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offices hours' or not. Tanaka-San's social world is rigid, ranked and ordered according 
to set rules and values, and he explains this to me openly when I fuhil my promise to 
Yamada-San to visit him that very night: 
"People of my age - old men - see the world a little differently." Tanaka-San speaks in 
his usual philosophical tones, but there is a wounded air about him, and I know that in 
his world, my lack of consideration for his position has hurt his feelings, and I am sorry. 
"For us, Japan is ordered and our communities are tightly bounded things. People's 
lives are carefully balanced and there is a place for everyone." He pauses briefly to light 
a cigarette, draws deeply, and continues. "There are relationships in business and 
between families that can't be messed with - they define the situation and you just can't 
put bosses in the same party as their employees." In an effort to demonstrate this, he 
asked me how, if he did come to my party, he would obtain an astray or a refill of his 
glass, As everyone was there as equals, turning to his usual servant clan would 
embarrass him and upset the relationships through which he operates daily in his 
business world, I explained very gently that at such parties the hosts provided drinks 
and anything else that the guest may require. However, I was talking to someone who 
wanted to give, and not to receive, cultural information. 
" I just couldn't deal with it...". He had picked up that I was seeing this as his problem 
and not a cultural one. " I mean, I spend every day of my working life with these 
people," he continued, "and I would have to worry about what kind of role to play. It's 
just.., impossible." He finished bluntly and I sensed again his wounded pride. Upset 
myself at the conclusion but aware now of its inevitability - he wasn't going to attend -1 
attempted to repair whatever generational, cultural and/or communication damage had 
occurred by saying, "Well, I'm sorry that things have turned out this way. Out of all 
the people I wanted to introduce to my family and express gratitude to at this party, you 
mattered most and it is you who will not be there". The words had the desired effect. 
Tanaka-San's expression changed and it seemed to me that he suddenly saw my 
attempt as a desire to include him, rather than separating him by inviting his 
employees and inferiors. Aware now of my intention, but still obviously constrained by 
the rules of the community as he saw it, he took the opportunity to create some good out 
of the situation. Looking at me with smiling, triumphant eyes, he slapped me on the 
shoulder and said, "Well., you can put i t all in your thesis!" 
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Tanaka-San would have been around fifteen years old when Japan lost the war. As he 
went through the pre-war education system, all the nationally unifying values imposed 
deliberately by the Meiji government would have defined his social world. These 
values were not merely picked up in passing, "they were firmly entrenched, in 
association with the family system and the authoritarian machinery of the state" (Naka, 
1977; 10). Therefore, not only can we rely on the assumption that "young people before 
the war had, in principle, at least, a group-orientated attitude to life" (Ibid., 1977; 11), 
but that such values and hierarchy structures were programmed from earliest life in the 
home for entrance into the wider community. Tanaka-San was part of that 
fossilization of the feudal elements of Edo Japan, implemented (fossilized) to such a 
degree by the Meiji government, that Waswo chooses to see the transition as the Partial 
Samuarization of Japan (1996). 
These values not only carried over feudal-derived organizational systems of family and 
community, but through the links forged with nationalism and imperialist ideology, 
taught the lesson that this state of organization and being was Japanese. Thus, by 
giving a kind of national stamp to a way of life, Tanaka-San's generation had their 
worlds effectively sealed from change - defined on all sides - and they became, as they 
were meant to, agents of the state in social organization and identity. This helps to 
answer the first of the two questions posed above - that Tanaka-San's direct and all 
encompassing involvement in the values and systems of Meiji Japan had been instilled 
within one particidar way of interacting and participating in social life. Although 
mixed with the infusion of many essentially modern elements that also came with Meiji 
Japan - a gradual move away from the rm-al community life and consequent break-up of 
traditional communities etc. - Tanaka-San's experiences on the social level were 
characterized by their exclusive dependence on traditional, part-feudal family and 
community structures. 
In order to answer the second question, we must see Tanaka-San's generation as 
markedly different from the one which followed. I t is not difficult to find the evidence: 
"It was clear that there were outstanding changes in young people's aims in life due to 
the differences of periods in which they lived, which resulted from the revolutionizing of 
various aspects of society" (Naka, 1977; 13). By no means least of these revolutionizing 
aspects was that "defeat (in the war) and the subsequent social change... brought about 
a collapse of ideological systems, and pluralised young people's value concepts. 
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relativising ideas and creeds" (Ibid., 1977; 10). In contrast to his generation, Tanaka-
San's postwar successors had clear tendencies to "set up as an ideal a life in accordance 
with personal preferences rather than for the benefit of society (Ibid., 1977; 11, my 
emphasis). 
Here, then, is our most obvious example of the flood-like entrance of typically modern 
social values into a largely traditional functioning social whole. Although naturally 
pre-war Japan was beginning to negotiate the co-existence of the traditional/modern, 
post-war Japan, with its emphasis on equality of the sexes, the virtual prohibition of the 
traditional ie household and its hierarchical trappings • all, of course imposed Western 
values - speeded up the pace and intensity with which ordinary Japanese were now 
negotiating their social organization and identities between notions of tradition and 
modernity. 
Thus, generations who grew up in post war Japan inherited a world in a state of 
fundamental change and at the same time were restricted in their interaction within 
such a world by the rigidity of form which older generations demanded. Preserved 
values still present in the education system - see Hendry 1992 - also restricted them. 
It is this transitional generation - those who participate in a world defined by those who 
feel, as older members, they have the right to order it - who have most experience of the 
duality of Japan's place between its own tradition and its own modernity. To these 
forty-somethings, Japan is poised between the young generations (often their children), 
seen as roaming a land of pure modernity, and their often resident parent(s) on the edge 
of life, who represent a world of extreme tradition. Such a position often results in the 
ability to participate in both worlds and so develops the dual ability to see the world as 
the product of ranked relationships between interlinking households, and as a group of 
common people simply attempting to produce community. 
There are two notes of caution in attributing this dual ability to participate in 
predominantly modern or traditional social groups to this fortysomthing, post-war 
generation. The first, and most obvious, is that a wide variety of particular 
circumstances exist which cause a multitude of exceptions to any generational 
generalization. The second, related point, is that such diversity tends to have resulted, 
not in 'exceptions to the rule', but rather in the adoption of a default modern or 
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traditional model. Simply put, although many of this generation can work in both 
mind sets, those who have had particular upbringings or circumstances tend to defer to 
one or the other as the predominant way to understand the world. 
This is not easy to prove, although some of the most convincing evidence comes in the 
guise of attitudes to the outside world and the consequent notions of self-as-nation. As 
seen in the historical development of available landmarks in the previous chapter, the 
'absolute traditional' mode of imagining oneself in the world is limited to one's local 
bounded community. With a sprinkling of modernity - brought about by the Meiji era -
this diversity expands to include identification with state and, to a certain extent, with 
Japan's place in the world. Traditional notions of world placement, as Masao (in 
Anderson, 1991) points out, can often involve a mere transferal of local hierarchy to an 
international sphere. Thus, notions of race, picked up from the Americans of the 1850s 
- white as superior etc. - still come to form part of a traditionally minded identity-in-
the-world package. These values and notions have been transferred through the Meiji 
era - indeed one could say as a composite part of the traditional values preservedhy the 
Meiji era - to the pre-war generation. The post-war generation thus picks up a large 
percentage of such values, and, mixed with the more modern notions of the post-war era, 
they provide the dual model. Post-war generations with less access to modern values -
or with liberated parents who are already moving away from traditional modes - thus 
develop a dominant traditional or modern interpretive model, and use corresponding 
landmarks to position themselves in their respective streams of cultural history. 
Consequently, I have found in my conversations with a variety of 40-50 year olds, a 
causal relationship between existence of traditional values in the family and community 
and views of the outside world. Briefly the more traditional values a person holds and 
organizational systems he is a part of, the more his views of himself as Japanese and his 
idea of the outside world will be essentially unchanged from those of his predecessors. 
Likewise, a holding and participation within a tj^aically modern value and 
organizational system will illustrate a significant departure in such views of nation-m-
the-world (self-other). This, i t must be said, is no great discovery, as Hendry (1992, 
1995) points out that the classification learnt in traditional family houses becomes, 
through socialization adapted for the outside community and wider world. Also, as we 
have seen, feudal hierarchy systems are often absolute self-fulfilling systems which by 
their very rigid adherence to station and rank, prevent, rather than encourage, change 
within themselves. However, it is useful to illuminate exactly what these views of the 
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outside world are, and how a subjection to predominately modern or traditional values 
and/or organizational systems configures the self in relation to the outside world. 
Taisho-San 
Taisho-San is a photographer, and at forty-two a young-looking, open-faced man. He 
has spent a year in Italy photographing village scenes and is having an exhibition next 
month. We talk a bit about his work and i t seems he speaks Italian, but his English is 
a bit rusty. He asks me about my work and having told him of my interest in 
examining the links between the traditional Japanese family and Japanese identity, he 
volunteers the following: 
"Many Japanese are still positioned in traditional families; that's right. And, yes, I 
would agree that such upbringings would have an effect on identity - perhaps 
accounting for the reputation of the narrow-mindedness of the Japanese as regards 
their views of the outside world. But this is nothing compared to the boundaries of 
nation that can be suddenly thrown up, by say religious circumstances..." 
Taisho-San is well versed in global rhetoric - a result of an in-depth relativisation of 
himself as Japanese in the world and the ability to transfer such knowledge to other 
nations. Also, unlike many Japanese, he has in-depth experience and a cultural 
relationship with another country. Such affiliation gives him a permanent bridge over 
any traditional cultural remnants which pull at his "Unique Japaneseness" and, by 
inference, incompatibility with the outside world. He is married, but on being asked, 
expresses no desire to perpetuate an ie family, of which he himself was not a part. 
Taisho-San, in comparison with his countrymen, represents a fine balance of 'modern' 
values with organizational systems. His landmarks for positioning himself in the 
world illustrate a distinct departure (almost opposition) to those available to ordinary 
Japanese throughout modern history. 
Yamada-San 
I have chosen Yamada-San here to represent the most common balance of modern and 
traditional elements for this generation. His abihty to apply either modern or 
traditional interpretative models to his social world is the most common feature of 
members of this generation. However, reaction to me as a foreigner (white), inspired 
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surprise in the first instance and continues to invoke a respect. This is in contrast to 
his visiting Korea and the Phihppines with work mates particularly for 'female 
adventure' and the essentially racist attitudes to these other Asian countries which I 
have heard him express. Clearly there is some racial superiority component at work 
here, which, as Oblas (1995) argues, is perpetuated (and in part 'justified') by the media. 
Yamada-San comes from a traditional ie system. His marriage to his wife was by 
negotiation rather than love, and the vast majority of his daily life is involved in the 
hierarchy of a business world run by older generations. Yamada-San's ability to see 
modern interpretations even from within a predominately traditional system is 
presumed to be due to the theoretical choice he had between vocation and social place 
while in education. Due to family and community factors, however, mobility was never 
much of an option, although his life is secure and happy enough for him not feel as 
though such choices were in rea/ity unavailable. He relates to me mostly as a person, 
but occasionally as a representative of pre-defined category - the white foreigner -
especially when in the company of those more traditionaUy minded than himself. This 
ability to switeh modes again illustrates his duality of interpretive mode. 
Hara-San 
Hara-San has said so many things to me which reveal his complete lack of 
understanding about the similarities between people that i t is difficult to know where to 
start. One of the most shocking displays of ignorance was when I informed him of my 
grandfather's death. On hearing that he was 74 when he died, Hara-San looked at me, 
and said with genuine astonishment, "You mean to say that white people die at about 
the same age as Japanese?" Although not a stupid man, Hara-San's world is his 
community of friends and family and what he sees on television. As a percentage of 
Japanese media does indeed broadcast notions of white foreigners being mere objects 
rather than people (see Creighton, 1993), and supports arguments pertaining to 
Japanese racial distinctiveness, Hara-San's views do not exist in isolation. However, 
he is an unusual configuration - almost entirely traditional in thought - to be found in 
his generation, and seems far more influenced by the pre-war generation, and 
consequently unaware of modern values, despite their existence. His views of Japan 
and the outside world result directly from historical reaction to Western notions of 
superiority and the crude attempt to substantiate such thinking by advancing Japanese 
superiority and uniqueness. He has never related to me as a person; I consistently 
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represent the white foreigner to him - all interaction on his part attempts to reaffn-m 
rather than challenge the established categories. 
The above three brief portraits of individual Japanese and their views of the outside 
world with regard their traditional vs. modern configuration of identity, is in no way 
supposed to represent the limitless diversity of ways in which such configurations show 
themselves in particular individuals. As such, I do not advance the view that the 
majority of Japanese in their forties go to Korea for female adventure, nor that to 
embrace modernity in Japan means that you need to speak Italian. What the portraits 
above attempt to show are two extremes and one arbitrary mid-point in a multitude of 
configurations of the modern and traditional, as seen in iSAree individuals. 
These individuals, in their open, simultaneously open/closed, or closed views of the 
outside world, also tend to belong to more modern based, mixed, or traditional based 
cultural systems, respectively, and that is why I present them here as illustrations. 
Also, i t must be said that traditional values are not necessarily 'anti-world', 'pro 
Japanese' values. The intimacy of traditional Japanese communities, which can and 
do include foreigners in various places in the country, help ordinary Japanese to receive 
knowledge about other countries through a traditional system. As such, I do not make 
as strong a statement as Shuichi (1992), that traditional values are an "obstacle" to 
internationalization as cross-cultural imderstanding, but a related one: that a 
concentration of traditional values preserves the use of feudal landmarks in 
understanding Japan's position vis-a-vis the wider world. Conversely, a concentration 
of modern values tends to jettison such notions and allows for change in the way in 
which 'Japan' is improvised (although tliis can lead to modern nationalism as easily as 
it can lead to international understanding). Due to what Naka (1977) refers to as 
'various revolutionizing aspects of Japanese society this century', the concentrations of 
these traditional and modern configurations have become representative of particular 
generations. This has illustrated how certain individuals attach themselves to the 
flows of their cultural histories in the present day. I t is here that we can now begin to 
follow this complex spread of diversity down and across the years • to the 
improvisational sounds of contemporary Japanese further removed from the initial 
clashes of tradition and modernity - the sons and daughters of the sons and daughters of 
the pre-war generations. 
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ChaptQr Five 
Generations of Change 
On the morning of the day of the party, before I was to meet my family at the airport, my 
girlfriend Yuki came down from her hometown as she did every other weekend or so. 
Despite the small amount of time we had available that morning, we decided to visit the 
Tanaka-Sans at their home. The purpose of this visit, we agreed, was to offer once 
more an apology for the misunderstanding which had occurred. Also, I wanted to make 
sure that no 'not wanting to involve them in my life' feehng remained or that to any 
degree I was ungrateful for the support and generosity which they had shown me 
during my time in Sweetwood. Yuki, with an acute sensitivity for the ways that 
sentiments work in traditional communities, also felt that she herself "being Japanese", 
should take some responsibility for not warning me of the possible outcome of arranging 
such a party. 
So i t was that we arrived at the house and were welcomed in by Tanaka-San's wife, who 
gave us the news that her husband was not around, having gone to see a friend in town. 
I , at least, was slightly relieved by this, knowing that the message would reach 
Tanaka-San that we had visited and that this, in itself would be sufficient to illustrate 
our concern. Yuki, however, seemed insistent that, if his wife had time, we would love 
to pop in for a quick chat. We were ushered in to a large tatami room and served tea. 
The conversation began with the usual pleasantries, followed by me apologizing and 
reiterating my real desire to have the Tanakas at the party. I explained that I hadn't 
consulted witii Tanaka-San in depth before organizing the party, because I assumed 
that the desire to introduce him into my Other World would be obvious. 
Tanaka-San's wife, a clever women, recognized the truth of this and, i t occurred to me 
then, saw the whole series of events very clearly. She had been the one through whom 
I had arranged the appointment with her husband; she had been the spokeswoman for 
Tanaka-San since the beginning of this chain of events and I had been talking to her on 
the phone about matters involving her husband and even my plans since I had moved to 
Sweetwood. In the words of her eldest son "she was the only person who could really 
deal with Tanaka-San". However, I knew instinctively that she also wanted to go to 
this party. She would' have enjoyed meeting new people - and especially my family. 
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She was essentially a kind woman and wanted to appear to be able to understand and 
relate to different people. 
I felt almost certain that she was disappointed with her husband's decision not to 
attend on the grounds of his rank and status. I sensed a deeper feeling also - an anger 
that the situation, in preventuig her from attending, exposed her dependence on her 
husband's decisions and went directly against her almost hidden feelings of self-worth 
and desire for greater independence. Having to confront these inconsistencies in 
herself made her feel bitter and enclosed, and more importantly, alone. In order to 
consolidate her position, she needed to feel established back in the community, to 
cement her wandering person back in the flow of local relationships. I represented the 
ultimate outsider and therefore there was little use she could make of me in 
repositioning her lost self Yuki, however, was not only Japanese, but an outsider to 
the local community, and a young woman. 
"I'm really so sorry not to have seen the cfrcurastances sooner." I heard Yuki apologize 
as I tuned back into the conversation between the two women. " I should have seen 
that, of course, Tanaka-San would have difficulty in attending a party where work 
colleagues were also to be present. I t was so silly of me not to notice. There is really no 
excuse...". 
Now Yuki had no responsibihty here at all. Not only did she live three hundred 
kilometers away, but she had httle knowledge of my day-to-day activities. Although 
she knew my intentions to have the party, she did not know who I was inviting. 
However, priding herself on the fact that she belonged to a similar intimate (traditional) 
community in her home town, she went about her interactions witliin the Sweetwood 
community with absolute cultural precision. There was a way of doing things, she 
would explain to me, a Japanese way - namely, to adhere to the complex art forms of 
community building which included appropriate behaviour, language and general 
custom. In a sense, such traditional community construction and maintenance were 
famihar because i t was the mode she entered when with her family, and (in a sense) she 
was acting the part because she, as a thirty-one year old woman who had travelled 
abroad, (I had met her in England), was free from the all-embracing aspects of what real 
membership meant. Or so i t seemed to Tanaka-San's wife. 
"Yes, well - we were going to contact you to see if you could explain to Bruce what was 
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happening behind the scenes - we didn't want to hurt him, you see - but in the end - I 
think i t was my eldest son who said i t - we decided that you too may not understand 
such things - having been abroad and all that." 
I t was a wounding statement, although I was unsure if i t was intended as such, and I 
saw Yuki visibly recoil. I t certainly did the trick in putting forward the conclusion that 
i t is impossible to make one's life broader, to belong to different groups of people without 
considerable sacrifice (losing sight of your own upbringing). I t also served to contradict 
any apparent temptation she may have harbored to do something that her husband 
would not have approved of (ie. going to such a party), as i t put her back into the 
protective station of her place as guardian of tTaditional community - protecting it from 
the plural notions of a young 'polluted' woman. 
We lef t soon after and Yuki broke down in tears in the car on the way home - the 
incident had h i t her hard. She wondered how people could be so cold and said that she 
hated the way that people sometimes viewed her differently just because she'd been 
abroad. I attempted to comfort her, and, knowing the personalities involved, talked of 
how Tanaka-San's wife had said those things to protect herself. I t helped a bit but 
Yuki was still shaken - the incident had challenged her membership not to the world of 
friends, jobs and day to day life, but to the world of her parents and her extended family. 
The values and systems under which they work were the same as those which the 
Tanaka-Sans belong, and her rejection from one was tantamount to a challenge of her 
status in both. 
I t is in this clash between Yuki and Tanaka-San's wife that we can identify wider 
fissures in the evolution of the modern vs. traditional social-scape. Firstly as 
illustrated by Naka (1977), the differences between pre-war and post-war suicide rates 
may be looked on as "an index of the progress of awareness of self and sense of their own 
rights as individuals among Japanese women" (pp. 69). Thus although pre-war 
generations of women in farming prefectures suffered very low status - "their sphere of 
life (being) restricted to the confines of the family" - suicide rates were surprisingly low. 
"Since the war, however, identical circumstances have come to be seen by the individual 
concerned as 'disappointment in love' or 'domestic discord', with a resultant increase in 
the number of women who choose suicide". The increased awareness of self and of 
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their own rights as individuals have resulted in "outstandingly high suicide rates 
among young women in Japan, in comparison with the rest of the world". Naka sees 
this as "due to various factors characterizing periods of transition to modern ways", 
particularly in the existence of "pre-raodern patterns of human relationship within the 
family that inhibit self-expression" (Ibid., 1977; 70). 
I t is such inhibition which Tanaka-San's wife sees present in her own life and absent in 
Yuki's. Tanaka-San's wife had a very difficult and low status early life. After her 
marriage her husband's mother treated her like a slave of sorts and up unti l her 
mother-in-law's death she lived exclusively in her husband's family home. In later 
years, however, wi th her husband's success, she began to lead a freer life and now does 
voluntary work, as well as mixing wi th a wide set of outside friends in a variety of 
activities. Her husband is a decent man but he still ensures that she is not on too free 
a reign, although recently he has not raised a finger against her passing her driving test, 
and i t seems as that they w i l l go abroad together next year for the first time. (He has 
gone to many places alone or with business colleagues). 
Her treatment of Yuki represents not only the gap which exists between their respective 
generational experiences of womanhood, but by inference, where larger negotiations 
and conllicts occur between those exposed to predominately traditional and. modern 
systems. For instance, her use of the 'landmark' that experiences abroad somehow 
contaminate or 'make-stupid' one's understanding of Japanese relationships is a 
common conversational manoeuver used to 'relativize' returnees from abroad (see White, 
1988). I n Tanaka-San's wife's case, I have shown the reason to be related to her need 
to return to her 'place as a woman' wi thin the community, but I venture to advance that 
all such statements excluding returnees from so-called 'Japanese society' are made from 
positions of fundamental inferiority in regard to the outside world and other people's 
experience of i t . I t is in this way of course, that such conflict illustrates powerfully the 
dynamics at work in the reproduction and preservation of culturally isolationist values 
within traditional Japanese communities. As pre-modern relationships rub with 
modern, notions of superiority and inferiority are breached, conflict arises and in order 
to avoid it, the power is handed to the inferior-feeling party who then, m turn, 
determines the status quo. 
This is largely the pattern of "tradition meets modernity on a community level" which 
has been occurring for at least five generations, and on a large scale in the last two. Yuki, 
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in her early thirties, however, represents a generation that although brought up under 
many of the group-orientated values of the education and local community systems (see 
Hendry 1992), is almost entirely 'modern-programmed'. Her generation are conscious 
of the need to identify wi th traditional parents but fundamentally different in their 
almost 'default' understanding of a Japan as a modern nation. Although i t has been 
argued that there have been times in Japan's history (the 1920's for instance - see 
Smith, 1972) which have shown clear generational trends, the shinjinrui (the new 
species) are the fir.st generation to be affected en mass by the impact of modernity. 
I t is this generation of approximately 27-35 year olds who grew up m the Japanese 
economic miracle. "We had no worries about our future employment - the world was 
ours", a friend of Yuki's once told me. Such an environment in the wider nation would 
have been a contrast to st i l l widespread traditional values i n the home and i t is likely 
that experiences like Yuki's wi th Tanaka-San may typify this generation - where 
segregation from tradition in the home leads to identification with peer groups outside -
a self-fulfiUing dynamic which moves people away from tradition into a world where 
they define themselves directly against a wider image of 'society'. I f this is so, we are 
identifying the f i rs t large scale fusion.of the individual with the state, a relationship 
which Gellner sees as essential to a modern society (1997). 
Certainly in my many conversations and meetings with people in this age range I f ind i t 
unusual for there to be much surprise or characterization of my foreignness, suggesting 
again the links between the visions of Japan-in-the-world and the participation within 
predominately modern or traditional value and organizational systems. However, my 
fieldwork here is limited to Tokyo, Hiroshima and Fukuoka cities, as my Sweetwood 
research has not yet considered in depth the views and values of these and younger 
generations. This is a limitation that w i l l be overcome in the next phase of research 
and subsequent thesis. The following brief portraits, then, do need to be seen as 
individuals within the social worlds of larger cities. Although this doesn't necessarily 
mean that traditional communities are less likely to be in existence (indeed they work 
just as effectively as m rural areas - see Hendry 1995), i t does represent a shght 
imbalance in the fact that rural or small-town life may induce stronger ties between 
parent, child and community, resulting in a less modern-minded generation. (I see this 
as likely but estimate the extent of the phenomena as not fundamentally challenging 
the generational argument thus stated). 
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Jun 
A t 28, Jun has much of the physical appearance of his father, Tanaka-San. I t was 
through Jun that I managed to be introduced to the community of Sweetwood. When I 
f i r s t met him, however, having no idea of his country-roots, he struck me as a very 
cosmopolitan and world-minded individual. Not only was his research at the 
University of Tokyo on education - his MA thesis being a detailed study of the education 
system in the U K • but his studies gave him a relativized position on Japan which 
seemed to remove him from the flow of its more isolating identity. Perhaps because of 
this world view, I , as a foreigner, did not represent an oddity or challenge to Jun's 
notions of his Japanese self - he did not have to expend energy f i t t ing me into his world. 
Interestingly, I have had the opportunity in Jun's company to meet Japanese who are 
obviously surprised at my foreignness. I n these situations, Jun takes on the role of 
mediator between the Japanese and myself, introducing me as representative of a 
foreigner and then, bit by bit, talking of my individual, personal differences. I t is an 
odd situation to be in, and Jun is very much the middle-man between what he sees as a 
world that he understands and has access to and the teaching of how to achieve such 
membership to other, less foreign-experienced Japanese. Here, Jun is very much the 
teacher that he wi l l no doubt become, packaging me as the 'foreigner' to begin with, to 
make the concept easily understandable, and then unwrapping, layer by layer, the 
individual differences which make me, after all, human. 
There is li t t le doubt that in his family life - his relations with his parents and the 
occasional times he returns to Sweetwood to visit - he is confronted with the traditional 
values I have illustrated in his mother and father. However, Jun wi l l always attempt 
here also to educate his parents in the more contemporary ways of seeing the world, and 
is very unwilling to allow the traditional values to be seen as the status quo. Jun has 
been empowered by a set of educational and personal opportunities to see Japan as a 
nation open to the world and with the ability to contribute to international society in 
many areas. His task is now to make sure such knowledge is passed to his countrymen, 
so that Japan as a whole may catch up with hke-minded people of his generation. 
59 
AtsusJj2 and Naoko 
Atsushi is a broad faced, sturdy man of thirty-one. His slightly chubby features give 
him a constant air of cheerfulness, a physical complement to his personality, which is 
large and warm. One is not surprised that the beautiful Naoko, one year his junior, 
has married him, and she herself, although quieter than he, comes across as a kind and 
open hearted person. Atsushi is a soccer coach at a soccer school in Tokyo and works 
long hours. Naoko, after her marriage, quit her job and now looks after the house and 
prepares for the children they plan to have in the next couple of years. 
As wi th many affluent people of this generation I have met in larger cities, they make 
no reference to my foreignness and characterizations of the white-foreigner are almost 
unknown. What's more, Atsushi's connections with the game of soccer provide a 
similar function as Jun's access to cross cultural education study - they relativize Japan 
as a nation within a world of others. This relativization creates a virtual forum in 
which to see nations pitched against one another in a world of equal opportunity; i t goes 
directly against traditional notions of race and Japan-versus-the-west. Indeed, not 
only is the world broken down into its component parts rather than huge racial divides, 
but through the individual players, followers of the game can see that theirs is a society 
having much in common with other modern societies. This notion not only represents 
a growing pluralism within Japanese society, but also, as McGregor (1996) suggests, is 
the basis of "a nicer new nationalism". 
Not only is this pluralism apparent in Atsushi and Naoko's response to me as a 
foreigner hut in the way they talk about the world in relation to Japan. More reveahng 
in the conversations I have had wi th them at various times, is the absence of any 
traditional modes of thought or interpretation. Likewise, traditional family values are 
almost entirely absent - although Naoko comes from a traditional ie family, Atsushi does 
not, and neither of them plan to implement any of the traditional hierarchies to futiu-e 
members. Although Kumagai (1996) would argue that even in this 'professional' 
generation, there are elements of tradition and modernity still in negotiation, these 
elements seem marginal (in historical terms) as against an overwhelming existence of 
typically modern values and organizational systems. 
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I t IS important to remember, when commenting on the majority of modern values 
present in this generation that their home-worlds may well be places where traditional 
modes of interaction and improvisation are the norm. Given the opportunity to create 
a world for themselves outside the home, however, this generation do seem to take 
advantage of the opportunities of growing economic and social modernity to attach 
themselves directly to society as 'modern' individuals. I have suggested that conflict of 
the sort illustrated between Yuki and Tahaka-San's wife can arise to fuel the process of 
assimilation to a world outside the traditional home. I t is also possible, however, that 
lit t le or no conflict arises, and members of this generation exist between their 
traditional home worlds and their own. Some conflict is inevitable, however, i f these 
people choose to start a new family separately from the traditional home - going against 
traditional values of entwining the lives of successive generations - and of course 
looking aft.er the elderly. 
Such separation and conflict is seen in the growing number of care homes for the elderly. 
Where traditional famihes are separated from the starting of new nuclear units (a trend 
which in itself emphasizes the adoption of modern values and rejection of tradition 
ones) the traditional family unit is steadily decreasing. Also, couples do not have the 
ability or desire to bring the constraining txaditional values of their parents into their 
modern worlds (Barrow, 1992). This is perhaps largely due to the fact that the core 
value systems of modernity illustrate almost direct opposition to the traditional notions 
analyzed in the previous chapters. 
What characterizes this modern generation, then, in comparison to those older than 
themselves, is that although that they, like the majority of their elders, have a dual 
modern/traditional model with which to interpret the world, their own world - their own 
direct connection with society has become the modern mode. Broadly speaking, this 
generation puts on the traditional interpretative mode when home with the parents or 
grandparents or in particular ritual situations, but in what they see as their world - the 
outside world - the rea7 experiential world of their partners and maybe even children, 
they use the modern interpretative model as default. 
What I have demonstrated here in terms of the generational norms of this twenty-
thirtysomethings generation, is, again, by no means absolute, there being many 
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exceptions to any generational grouping. However, we can identify in this generation 
certain widespread trends involving a movement away from tradition. A broadening in 
ideas of Japan in relation to the outside world can be seen not just in reactions towards 
me in my fieldwork but by changes in the media representation of foreigners in 
advertising. Where more contemporary generations are now considered as target 
market groups, images of the foreigner have changed from the depiction as 'objects' to 
those of 'real people' (see Creighton, 1995) to align with the value systems of such 
generations, 
The position of women - their place as increasingly equal members of society - is also 
given most expression within this age grouping. There seems to be a large group of 
women soccer fans emerging, a trend which illustrates a significant move from the 
traditional place in the home, to a place in-the-nation, while expectations of women held 
by the older generation (witness Yuki and Tanaka-San's wife), seems representative of a 
different era. 
The recent growth of soccer is particularity interesting, and the great majority of 
supporters belong to this generation (or younger). Such popularity allows a feeding 
back of a nationally relativized Japan to more traditional communities, through the 
agents of media. I have seen this in the change of national values expressed by Sato-
San (my Sweetwood friend) before during and after the world cup, when he and his wife 
and children grouped together to cheer Japan on in front of the television. The 
experience allowed him to connect directly wi th Japan as a nation rather than through 
the filter of his community and its traditional views of the world (see again McGregor, 
1996). 
Of course, there are those in this generation who have had less opportunity or desire to 
attribute themselves to the generational grouping on offer, and therefore remain 
involved with the communities of their parents and grandparents. These people are 
likely to display more traditional values and therefore tend to be more like the 
generation before them. However, in my conversations and informal interviews with 
urban members of this age group, I have found overwhelming evidence of modern ways 
to see the world and its organizational systems which often directly counter the 
traditional notions analyzed in the previous chapters. 
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I t is by examining younger generations' improvisations of community - and the 
landmarks they use to position themselves within their cultural histories - that we can 
often obtain rich information about such cultural histories and suggest the directions 
and trends of their continuing development; "They (young people) point backward to our 
histories and forward to our futures" (White, 1994; 49). In identifying the shinjinrui 
generation in Japan as representing a continuing negotiation of tradition and 
modernity we see not only their position withm a move towards modern value and 
organizational systems, but through the conflicts with the older generations and the 
departures they have made from traditional forms of social life, the historical progress 
of a central tradition/modern fulcrum upon which modern Japanese society has been 
consistently defined and improvised. Most importantly this charting of cultural 
improvisation and identity has illuminated the increase of diversification which occurs 
as a society travels through time. Perhaps predictably then, i t is to the study of even 
younger generations, people in their teens or early twenties, that researchers 
increasingly turn to unfold the diversity in Japan's cultural miheu. 
White's (1994) study of Japanese teenagers, for instance, shows their world to be, in all 
aspects from friendships to their conceptualizing of the world outside Japan, victim to 
an enormous expansion of social diversity within their generation. Indeed, she sees 
this diversity as the result of significant changes in the way Japan has and is being 
imagined and improvised, and consequently she marks its presence as fundamentally 
different from the Japan of previous generations. " I t is the teens themselves who have, 
with some confusion and discomfort, come to terms with a consciousness of diversity 
and i t is this diversity amongXBens themselves, in famdy life, buying power, sexual and 
interpersonal experience, political and personal ideas - that w i l l indeed be the basis of 
new thinking on the nature of Japanese society" (White, 1994; 221). 
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Chapter Six 
The Common Symphonies 
On holiday wi th Jun and his parents in Korea recently, I had the good fortune to see 
how the Japanese improvised a variety of communities when outside Japan. The 
Tanakas had kindly offered to take me to Seoul after I expressed an interest i n visiting 
another Asian country. Jun, although not happy to spend too much time with his 
parents, wanted very much to meet up with a couple of Korean friends he hadn't seen 
for a long time. 
So i t was that the four of us arrived, on a cloudy Wednesday afternoon, at Seoul airport, 
and a bus ride later, at a huge hotel and shopping complex in the downtown area. 
Tanaka-San, (Jun's father), pushed us forward to the front desk - we had been 
designated I n Charge Of AH Interaction With Koreans, due, I presume, to our Outside 
Japan Experience. I t soon became clear, however, that al l staff at this complex could 
speak both English and Japanese. Indeed, many seemed completely trilingual, and i f 
not, were certainly more fluent in Japanese than English. This, interestingly did not 
change matters, and Tanaka-San was sti l l insistent that Jun and I take care of all 
interactions foreign in nature. 
During the three days I spent in Seoul, I was acutely aware of the many groups of 
Japanese and their impressions of the Koreans. I overheard conversations in lifts, in 
shops, in restaurants and in bars. By far the most common theme was the fact that so 
many of the Koreans spoke Japanese. This was talked about endlessly by groups of 
middle-aged men, who found great amusement in imitating the imperfections of speech 
they had heard around town. They would laugh openly in firont of shop keepers just 
because they were being spoken to in their own language and seemed quite unaware 
that these were real people at all. 
A l l the politeness and form of relating to others seemed to disappear from the behaviour 
patterns of some groups of older Japanese. And i t seemed that while they were 
powerfully re-enforcing their internal group identities with each other, they had no 
capability to relate to a world outside of that group. A t no time during my field work 
had the connection between the methods of traditional community construction, (the 
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maintenance of strong internal networks and consequent weakness of out-group 
relations), and the results of transferring such methods to an international sphere, been 
so obvious. 
In stark contrast to these isolated groups of Japanese, Jun's interpretation of this 
environment sought to encompass, to experience and to make broad his understanding 
of the people and culture in whicb he found himself From the moment we met his 
Korean friends several hours after checking in, Jun's behaviour sought to find 
commonality, to share stories and impressions - to improvise a world which he saw 
himself co-inhabiting with his friends. 
During those three days Jun and 1 moved in two worlds. From the daily time with his 
parents, to the nights out with his Korean li-iends, our social positions altered radically. 
We heard Jun's father talk of the racism which existed in his generation against 
Koreans - apparently, when he was young the worst insult you could give someone was 
to call them a Korean Wog (my translation). We saw how even when addressed in 
perfect Japanese by a Korean, Jun's parents would show litt le or no courtesy (a result of 
their lack of abihty to relate to outsiders, I argue, rather than a reflection on their 
personalities). And then we would talk into the night wi th Jun's friends about travel, 
sex life, Japan, Korea, and just about anything that people talk about when thrown 
together for hours. We were moving between a world held in place by the organization 
of inside and outside divisions, and one where diversity, in itself, provided the basis for 
belonging. 
The separateness of these two communities (his parents and his friends)- with their 
respective landmarks and ways of relating to people - often became topics of 
conversation as Jun and I attempted to consolidate our position In-Between. In one 
such conversation Jun offered the following:- "My father just fives in a different world 
- a closed world, a business world - which doesn't allow him to experience anything 
different from what he already thinks he knows. He doesn't even understand my 
world as a student, how 1 relate to my friends or the purpose or meaning of my research. 
What annoys me the most", says Jun, visibly hur t by the lack of understanding, "is that 
he doesn't even try". 
My time in Korea with the Tanakas brought me closer to all of them while illustrating 
clearly the fault fines'along which their relationships are delicately balanced. I t 
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showed me how, even within a society where people learn to co-operate and distinguish 
inside-group from outside-group early in the education system, (see Hendry, 1992), 
there can be wildly different ways in which such categorization manifests itself as group 
identity in later life. 
Indeed, we can see how the learnt construction of inside and outside gi'oups can allow 
for a diversity of world views (as seen predominantly m Jun's generation), or 
(traditionally) produce group collectives which operate at the expense of the 'strange 
(foreign) outsider'. The latter requires further investigation not merely because 
underneath such dynamics lie basic methods of community improvisation, but more 
importantly, as illustrated by some groups of Japanese wandering the Seoul hotel 
complex, such a collective can exclude foreigners, producing an internal, bounded 
Japanese Identity. 
Hendry's (1992) work on group identity illustrates how the learning of inside and 
outside divisions is part of a Japanese child's socialization. 
The outsider is dubbed okashii (strange, pecuhar) and other chUdren may laugh at 
one who cries. This is consistent with a sanction threatened by mothers and other 
caretakers that people wil l laugh at a child who fails to comply. I t also reinforces 
the notion that security and satisfaction is on the inside, joining in with the new 
ticAi (inside) group of fellow kindergartners, and few children stand outside for long. 
They soon reahze that there is little choice about cooperating with the group, that 
the way to gain attention and benefit personally is to be an active participant (Ibid., 
pp59). 
The methods of constructing these uchi, (or inside), groups are not limited to the 
confines of the kindergarten. Establishing and belonging to ucAi groups, Hendry sees 
as characterizing individual Japanese in all spheres of social hfe, and can be thus 
represented as "a series of concentric circles, wi th the smallest, most intimate group in 
the middle, and the largest probably being the uchi group of afl Japanese people" 
(Hendry, 1995; 223). I t is here, then, that we can see how socialization can produce a 
Japanese identity which has the same formula for its maintenance as the local 
community - to re-enforce in-group identity in opposition to out-group. As a method by 
which to improvise community, (and returning to the examples raised in chapter one), 
we are replacing Brian and Ignacio's 'beginners guide to social life' as that of 
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improvisation around nation, to those improvisations which revolve around inside and 
outside group memberships (with may or may not involve notions of nation). 
So the traditional method of imagining oneself within a group in Japan revolves around 
notions of inclusion vis-a-vis the excluded. As such, when these notions are put onto an 
international realm, segregation at obvious differences of language and/ or appearance, 
becomes a cheap and easy way to score points among fellow peers by accentuating the 
out-group-ness of the individual in question while simultaneously re-enforcing the 
inclusive boundaries of the group. Broadly speaking, i t is this dynamic which is at 
work in many meetings between Japanese and foreigners. Foreigners can often 
misread the exclusion as deep-seated nationalism, but as 1 suggested in chapter three, 
such communities are far more embedded in pre-modern hierarchical systems (which 
Gellner suggests do not allow nationafism to occur), than a result of a modernizing, 
unifying, Japanese national movement. 
The relationship between the traditional Japanese community and the production of 
such in-groups (uchi) is a strong one. Not only do the principles underlying the 
traditional family unit (j'e household^ correspond to the hierarchies learnt later in school 
and then in the community, but the in-group study of 'how-txi-be' or 'what-role-to-play', 
are also transferable skills throughout Japanese social life (see also Hendry 1995). In 
encompassing the realms of family, school community and wider society, the traditional 
Japanese social system can be seen as a raore-or-less absolute system of belonging. 
Having its foundations in the production and maintenance of in-groups, i t includes 
rules of membership, and the decided root chords of improvisation ensure adherence to 
the group through ridicule and reward. 
In all these regards, Japan's social system has developed in response to the 
environment of a predominantly agrarian society. With its emphasis on the 
maintenance of rigid systems of rank and hierarchy, and with the notion of in-group 
relationships often outweighing cross-group ones, i t fits quite neatly with Gellner's 
(1997) vision of the social landscape of feudal society. I n the exclusive nature of the 
traditional in-group construction, diversity is discouraged, whether on small or large 
scale community construction (class-group or nation). These factors coupled with 
Japan's cultural history and its relative lack of conflict, make some commentatx)rs 
suggest "that i t wi l l be difficult (for Japan) to cultivate a real tolerance for a diversity of 
values" (Yasushi, 1992). Such concerns have brought about wide-spread debates on 
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Japan's 'internationalization' and just how i t can be achieved. 
However, contemporary Japan illusti-ates how these issues are not only being debated 
by foreign or domestic commentators attempting to understand or 'explain' Japan, but, 
far more importantly by the successive generations of Japanese who exist witJiin the 
constant negotiations and improvisations of cultural identity. I t is the internal conflict 
arising from Japan's particular blend of traditional and modern elements which is the 
agent of major change in the way the world is seen as a series of inclusive groups or an 
assessable whole of which Japan itself is a part. 
Jun's attitudes toward his father represent a clear, (if somewhat extreme), example of 
how a diversity of cultural experience has entered his shinjinrui generation, starkly 
contrasting i t against the predominantly traditional values of his parent's social world. 
Jun's interaction with his Korean friends, and his desire to experience and learn about 
Korean culture, illustrate Jun's vision of himself as part of a world which has common 
themes of existence (landmarks) across various nations. In opposition to his parents 
he relates "to (his) total society directly without mediation, rather than by first to one of 
its sub-groups" (Gellner, 1997:2^), and such direct connection to an idea of himself as an 
individual in the flow of the diversity of a modern nation, positions him firmly able to 
relate across nations - to those he sees in similar positions as himself. 
That the education Jun and his generation received taught the same lessons of the 
importance of in-group out-group construction illustrates that such values can come to 
work to strengthen relationships between friends of any category (rather than divide 
people by their foreigness). Along with the injection of modern values and the diversity 
of cultural experience which accompanies such values, comes the ability to construct 
in-groups which have cross-cultural understanding and acceptance of others as their 
primary membership requirement. Thus, those who are outsiders to these concepts -
often older, more traditionally-minded parents - become the 'outsiders' which help to 
give the group definition. 
I t is here, in the separation of those who make Japanese identity exclusive, that young 
generations truly depart in their 'musical styles', by bringing on board a whole new set 
of landmarks wi th which to relate to the world. At this intersection of tradition and 
modernity - the point at which tradition becomes a defined Other against a modern 
identity - we see clearly the wider transition from the traditional use of Other to define 
68 
Japan-the-nation (through inclusion/exclusion), to the vision of Japan a nation 
immersed in a common global diversity. I t is a transition seen by White (1994), 
Creighton (1995), and Waswo (1996) as representing fundamental change in the make-
up of Japanese society. 
I t is always tempting to see the present as a turning point, and to assign to 
unfolding events or trends a significance they may not in the end deserve, but I 
cannot help feeling that the temptation is justified so far as contemporary 
Japanese society is concerned (Waswo, 1996; 163). 
Cominon to many of these theories that Japan i t at a point of fundamental transition 
with regard its identity, is the notion that this is a generational phenomena. I have 
attempted to identify in this paper, how, from the considerations of the Mei j i leaders to 
the feefings of professional Tokyoites about their nation, ordinary Japanese have been 
and are positioning themselves wi th in the cultural histories which feed their 
improvisations of community - their identities. From the pre-modern ideas of one's 
place in the world, through the part-modernizing, part feudal-fossilizing Meij i period, 
and into the 1990s, there has continued to emerge layer after layer of cultural diversity. 
The unfolding of this diversity, however, has streamed from a central negotiation within 
the social milieu - the co-existence of traditional and modern values and patterns of 
social organization within a united cultural whole. At this central pivot of 
improvisational production hes the conflict between those who are born into the 
streams of power relations created by the older generations and the subsequent change 
which they implement. Repetitive negotiation coupled wi th influential historical 
events have resulted in wide-spread common generational trends in the production of 
cultural identity. As such The Generation has become an agent of cultural change, the 
diversity of ways in which Japanese improvise their social worlds broadening with each 
reproduction. I t is this process that I see as l inking the youth of Japan with the youth 
of other nations. 
The uncertainties facing youth today are not necessarily unrelated. These are the 
residues of societies governed by older people and of histories generated by older 
people, and younger people f ind themselves thrust into this stream of power 
relations and change (Spencer, 199l;l) . 
I t is this immersion into the streams of cultural histories produced by older generations. 
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and the simultaneous participation in a society which seems unlike that being defined, 
which at once produces the generational change skete'hed out in the previous chapters 
and links the Japanese youth to youth-of-the-world. As in White's (1994) study of 
Japanese teenagers, we see that at the very point at which young people forge their own 
interpretations against those of their elders • defining for themselves new styles of 
improvisation - we begin to see the unfolding of an infinite cultural diversity. Echoing 
much of Wliite's perspective on a more global sample, Amit-Talai (1995), puts is as 
follows:-
Youth cultural production occurs at home, at school, at work, at play, on the street, 
wi th friends, teachers, parents, siblings and bosses, draws elements from home-
grown as wefi as transnational influences, and intertwines with class, gender, 
ethnicity and locality with all the cultural diversity that such a multiplicity of 
circumstances compels. Such multi-culturalism imparts to youths, as to adults, a 
degree of consciousness that goes beyond any one situation, an awareness that 
each moment is embedded within a range of cultural possibilities (Ibid., pp.231). 
I t is this degree of consciousness that is beginning to pervade the construction and 
adherence to the in-group dynamic on the international realm. Simply, i t is becoming 
far less likely that young Japanese w i l l use the foreigner as a symbolic Other to distance 
in order to produce the internal Japanese category. "The 1990s may be a decade of 
marked change in attitudes towards foreigners, as young Japanese who have grown up 
seeing them as ordinary people come of age. There are also intentional promptings to 
encourage Japanese of all ages to reflect on their own degree of acceptance of others" 
(Creighton, 1995; 157). 
I t is hoped that by tracing the unfolding of cultural diversity in Japan, through the 
evolution of views of the outside world and corresponding Japanese identity, the paper 
has gone some way to show how many young Japanese use diversity as an inclusive 
unifying concept rather than seeing i t as a threat to an exclusive identity. Most 
importantly, I wish to emphasize how such a transition represents a more universal 
processes of global cultural change. As Japanese young people respond to the 
unfolding dynamics of their social place in an historical process of negotiation around 
tradition and modernity, so does youth in many parts of the world. The relatedness of 
world youth is in this negotiation of their place in cultures which are unique in their 
blend of traditional and modern elements, but which are common in the diversity that 
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improvisations of community, through history, have produced. 
The heavy rain on the tent shrouds the four of us in a conversational intimacy. Words 
tu rn to images without effort of the imagination. Yuki and I have taken Hiro and 
Hiroko (my Tokyo friends) camping in the mountains of Kyushu - they're on a break 
from the big city - and Hiroko is talking about her thoughts on the Japanese news; 
"I t just seems to be that in all the coverage of disasters, it's as if, the announcer says 
'Well there were no Japanese killed', and there is this lit t le space for the feehng 'Well 
isn't that a bloody relief. I t just makes me think how narrow minded the news can be -
I mean, where is the compassion from other people and why is i t only Japanese who 
matter?" 
"That's really interesting," I quickly say "I've always thought that myself, but took i t to 
be a kind of foreigner reaction - it's a relief to hear that some Japanese think it's a bit 
narrow minded, too." I wondered how Hiroko, a girl in her mid twenties, who has 
never been to a foreign country speaks litt le English, and whose only experience of 
foreigners is this friend of her boyfriend that she doesn't know very well, came to this 
inspired position. I decided to ask her how she came to see the news like that. 
" I t was during the Kobe earthquake, I think. Of course, so many people were following 
the rescue operation on the tele, and I remember the thousands of foreign aid workers 
who just flew in to help out - the attention and concern from foreign countries was just 
amazing. And then there is some disaster on the other side of the world and Japan is 
just worried about whether any Japanese are dead - like it's just not right, man." 
"Well", 1 say, thinking that that's definitely going to find its way into the thesis 
somewhere, "it's a really refreshing thing to hear, as I often feel alone in such thoughts." 
"Well," she laughs, "now you know it's not just you with a gaizin (foreigner) complex. 
It's just a way for people to make themselves more secure in their own li t t le world. 
And sometimes it's bfindingly obvious that's what i t is, isn't that right, Hiro?" She 
turns to her boyfriend and thumps him on the leg to entice a response. Hiro nods, and 
says, "Yep, it's crap, but it's Japanese". We laugh. 
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